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 This dissertation comprises three essays under the umbrella of behavioral 
research on price partitioning. The first essay examined consumers’ responses to 
financially equivalent prix fixe menu prices with a built-in gratuity, a separately listed 
percentage gratuity or a separately listed dollar gratuity at surcharge levels different 
from the 15% tipping benchmark. I demonstrated that surcharge level moderated the 
relationship between menu price presentation and consumers’ deal perception and this 
moderating effect can be explained by the evaluability of the individual price 
components within a partitioned price. 
 The second essay further explored surcharge framing by studying the 
differential effects of voluntary versus mandatory service gratuity on consumers’ 
menu price perception and demand. Findings from three experiments indicated that a 
Sunday brunch price with 15% customary tipping led to a lower perceived 
expensiveness and higher patronage intent than the same price with a 15% mandatory 
service gratuity. More importantly, through process measure analyses and mediation 
tests, the studies provided converging evidence that participants’ use of surcharge and 
perceived surcharge fairness acted in parallel and with similar strengths as mediators 
of the relationship between surcharge policy and menu price perception. I also found 
that participant’s patronage intent was mediated by both surcharge fairness perception 
 and price expensiveness perception, although the impact of the former mediator was 
significantly stronger.  
     As an extension of my empirical work using a multi-process approach to 
studying price partitioning effects, the third dissertation essay described an integrative 
framework on the psychological mechanisms for processing partitioned prices. Based 
on a review and synthesis of extant research, I identified seven processing routes and 
suggested that an individual will take a particular route to process a partitioned price 
depending on five key characteristics of its secondary price component. This 
integrative model can adequately yet parsimoniously differentiate among the various 
psychological mechanisms underlying the price partitioning effects and potentially 
resolve some inconsistent findings in the literature.  
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CHAPTER 1 
THE IMPACT OF PRICE EVALUABILITY ON PRIX FIXE MENU PRICE 
JUDGMENT 
 
Introduction 
Prix fixe is a French phrase meaning “a complete meal offered at a fixed 
price”(Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 2003). Restaurants offering prix fixe 
dining typically allow each customer select multiple courses (e.g., one appetizer, one 
entrée and one dessert) from a special menu at a set price per person. Although prix 
fixe menus are not as common as a la carte menus on which restaurants list and price 
each item separately, they seem to be gaining popularity. Restaurants have used prix 
fixe meals to showcase their signature dishes, to cater functions or special crowds, to 
promote seasonal food and to manage excess inventory.  
  As social etiquette in the US, restaurants normally leave to customers to 
decide how much to tip. According to the tipping guide on money.cnn.com, it is 
common for restaurant patrons to voluntarily leave 15% of pre-tax bill as gratuities for 
adequate service (“CNN/Money: How much to tip,” n.d.). For prix fixe meals, 
however, restaurants often impose a mandatory service gratuity above the 15% tipping 
benchmark. There are two main considerations for this pricing practice. First, serving 
prix fixe meals tends to entail substantial labor, particularly if the meal has more than 
three courses or wine parings or involves large dining parties. To ensure that waiters 
and other staff are appropriately compensated for their time and efforts, it may be 
necessary for restaurants to require service gratuities above the standard 15% tipping 
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rate. Second, restaurants frequently present prix fixe meals as special deals due to their 
important roles in revenue generation and inventory control. To maintain a decent 
profit, restaurant operators may choose to charge a mandatory, higher-than-average 
service gratuity to offset the relatively inexpensive meal price.   
 One critical issue for restaurants who post mandatory service gratuities higher 
than the 15% benchmark for their prix fixe meals is how to present the menu price. 
Although previous research has shown that restaurants may be better off if they 
separately list the standard 15% mandatory service gratuity on the menu rather than 
build it into the menu price (Wang & Lynn, 2007), other studies suggested that the 
positive effect of price partitioning relative to price consolidating may not prevail 
when the surcharge deviates from its reference level (Bertini & Wathieu, 2008; 
Burman & Biswas, 2007; Cheema, 2008; Sheng, Bao, & Pan, 2007). Therefore, the 
primary objective of this paper is to examine the potential moderating effect of 
mandatory service gratuities above or below the 15% standard on the relationship 
between prix fixe menu price presentation and consumers’ deal perception. In addition, 
I am interested in whether presenting a mandatory service gratuity in percentage term 
induces differ ent responses from customers than does presenting the same surcharge 
in dollar amount. 
 The structure of this paper is as follows. I first review relevant literature and 
construct hypotheses on how price evaluability influences consumers’ deal perception 
on prix fixe menu price. I then describe an online experiment that tests the specific 
predictions. Finally, I discuss the results and provide managerial implications for 
pricing prix fixe menus based on the findings from this research.  
 3 
Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses Development 
 An extensive amount of research in behavioral pricing has substantiated the 
fact that presenting the price of an offer in separate parts (i.e., a base price plus 
mandatory surcharges) induces different responses from customers than does 
presenting a financially equivalent consolidated price. Some researchers suggest that 
compared with an all-inclusive presentation, the presence of multiple components in a 
partitioned price increases consumers’ cost of accurately recognizing the total price 
(Hooman Estelami, 2003a, 2003b; Morwitz, Greenleaf, & Johnson, 1998). However, 
because the relative magnitude of the surcharge to the base price is typically small, it 
may not be worthy for consumers to spend extra time and cognitive efforts to integrate 
individual price components using precise calculation. Rather, they tend to either 
anchor on the base price and make insufficient adjustment to account for the surcharge 
or simply ignore the surcharge altogether (Morwitz et al., 1998). As a result, on 
average, partitioned prices often lead to an underestimate of the total price and a 
higher demand than comparable all-inclusive prices (Lee & Han, 2002; Morwitz et al., 
1998). 
 Alternatively, other researchers maintain that partitioned price presentation 
makes each individual price component and its associated benefits salient and 
accessible (Bertini & Wathieu, 2008; Chakravarti, Krish, Paul, & Srivastava, 2002). 
As a result, consumers may attend to and appraise those individual price components 
and use the ensuing evaluative judgments to construct their preference or gauge 
demand. For example, several studies have demonstrated that consumers’ preferences 
between partitioned and consolidated prices are contingent on their fairness 
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perceptions of the partitioned surcharge (Burman & Biswas, 2007; Cheema, 2008; 
Sheng et al., 2007). When consumers perceive the surcharge as unreasonable or 
unjustifiable, they prefer an all-inclusive price over the corresponding partitioned price. 
The opposite is true when the surcharge is perceived as fair.  
Price judgment often takes the form of comparing the observed price to its 
reference price or price range (Monroe, 1973). One issue for consumers exposed to a 
partitioned price is how to integrate their judgments on individual price components to 
form an overall price evaluation. Research on evaluation mode proposes that when 
consumers are asked to conduct an evaluation on a multi-attribute option 
independently (i.e., a separate evaluation mode), the impact of an individual attribute 
on the overall assessment is often related to its evaluability (Hsee, Loewenstein, 
Blount, & Bazerman, 1999). In the context of partitioned price judgment, evaluability 
refers to whether consumers can assess a price component of the partitioned price with 
confidence (Bertini & Wathieu, 2008). It is suggested that consumers’ price 
expectations or beliefs have a significant impact on their perceived price evaluability 
(Kalyanaram & Winer, 1995). Accordingly, consumers may find an individual price 
component less evaluable due to the lack of comparative standards and hence assign 
less weight to it in their overall price evaluation. On the other hand, if they have a 
well-defined reference level or reference range for the observed price component, they 
will be more confident in making a price judgment. Furthermore, when the observed 
price component deviates from its reference level or reference range, the resulting 
positive or negative judgment in terms of transaction utility (Thaler, 1985, 1999) and 
fairness perception (Xia, Monroe, & Cox, 2004) may exert disproportionate impact on 
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the overall price evaluation and demand (Bertini & Wathieu, 2008).  
To examine the influence of price evaluability on consumers’ perception and 
evaluation of a partitioned price, I conducted an online experiment in the context of 
prix fixe menu price. Before I discuss how price evaluability influence consumers’ 
deal perception on prix fixe menu prices, two characteristics of service gratuities at 
restaurants are worth-noting. First, unlike most types of surcharges, restaurant service 
gratuities are established and bounded by the social norm of tipping and fairly 
standard across the country. Consequently, consumers’ reference range for restaurant 
gratuities is fairly constricted and homogenous and a service gratuity above (below) 
the standard 15% should bring about negative (positive) evaluative judgment on the 
surcharge. Second, the fact that restaurant service gratuities are usually specified as a 
percentage of the bill further facilitates price comparison and judgment because they 
are stated in relative units and are not influenced by variations in dish prices or check 
sizes. On the other hand, it is more difficult for consumers to compare the prices of 
menu items since factors such as portion size, special ingredients, reputation of the 
chef, as well as restaurant ambiance could all contribute to a less-defined reference 
range for even the most common dishes. Hence I argue that in general restaurant 
service gratuities have more evaluability than dish prices. As a result, for prix fixe 
menus with all-inclusive prices, given that the surcharge level is masked by the price 
format and obscured by the relatively blurry reference range of dish prices, 
divergences from the standard 15% should have little impact on consumers’ deal 
perception. However, a shift from a built-in gratuity to a separately listed percentage 
gratuity should enhance the evaluability of the surcharge at levels different from the 
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15% standard. Therefore, consumers’ deal evaluations should be shaped more by their 
evaluative judgments on the percentage gratuity. Specifically, I proposed that: 
H1: Prix fixe menu prices with a percentage service gratuity below the 
standard 15% will be evaluated more favorably than equivalent all-inclusive 
prix fixe menu prices. Prix fixe menu prices with a percentage service gratuity 
above the standard 15% will be evaluated less favorably than equivalent all-
inclusive prix fixe menu prices.  
 If evaluating a percentage gratuity is straightforward for customers because of 
its small and clear reference range and invariance to the base price, then changing the 
separately listed surcharge from a percentage gratuity to a corresponding dollar 
gratuity is likely to reduce the evaluablity of the surcharge by obscuring the 
comparison standard. However, stating a service gratuity as a dollar amount is less 
common, and this novel practice may encourage consumers to direct their attention 
and cognitive efforts to convert the dollar-denominated gratuities to the more familiar 
and informative percentage frame. Since directly figuring out the approximate 
percentage level of a dollar gratuity involves relatively complex calculations, I 
proposed that consumers are more likely to work backwards. Specifically, I suggested 
that consumers will first estimate the dollar amount of a 15% gratuity. Then they 
compare that calculated dollar value with the observed dollar gratuity. If the actual 
dollar gratuity is higher (lower), they would make an upward (downward) adjustment 
from the 15% to approximate the corresponding percentage gratuity. Either way, 
previous research suggests that the adjustments tend to be inadequate (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974), resulting in a calculated percentage level closer to the standard 15% 
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than it actually is (please see figure 1.1). This converting process makes consumers 
more accommodating to the divergences of gratuities from the standard 15% when 
they are specified in dollar term than when they are specified in percentage term. 
Consequently, consumers exposed to dollar service gratuity should have less polarized 
deal evaluations of the menu price than those exposed to equivalent percentage 
gratuity. The above discussion is summarized in the following hypothesis: 
H2: Prix fixe menu prices with percentage service gratuity below (above) the 
standard 15% will be evaluated more (less) favorably than those with 
equivalent dollar service gratuity.  
 I tested the above hypotheses with an online experiment described below.  
 
 
                Figure 1.1: The suggested process for estimating the percentage level of a dollar service gratuity  
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Method 
 
Participants 
 Six hundred and six consumer panelists from a national marketing research 
company participated in my study to earn incentive points upon completion of the 
online experiment. One hundred and six of them did not go through the entire 
experiment process and were excluded from the analyses. Of the 500 participants 
included in the analyses, 42% were men and 84% were Caucasian. Their ages ranged 
from 16 to 82, with the average being 40.39. Two percent of the participants had some 
education, 21% were only high school graduates, 41% had some college, 24% were 
college graduates, and 11% had done post-graduate work. Eighteen percent of the 
participants reported a household income less than $25,000 a year, 40% reported 
between $25,001 and $50,000, 31% reported between $50,001 and $100,000, and 11% 
reported more than $100,000 a year. Their average dining out frequency at full-service 
restaurants was four times per month, with a low response of zero time per month and 
a high response of 99 times per month. Thus, the sample represented a diverse group 
of restaurant patrons. 
 
Design and Procedure 
 The experiment is a 3 (surcharge level: 12% vs.18% vs. 23%) x 3 (surcharge 
format: percentage vs. dollar vs. built-in service gratuity) between-subject design. I 
chose 12% and 18% to represent relatively common gratuity levels with the same 
modest deviation below and above the 15% standard. I expected that consumers would 
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have a less favorable perception on an 18% service gratuity and a more favorable 
perception on a 12% service gratuity. In addition, I included a 23% service gratuity to 
examine participants’ reaction to an aggressively priced service gratuity.   
 Participants first read a scenario where they were asked to imagine that they 
are dining with a friend before seeing a Broadway show at a table-service restaurant 
with a good online review on customer service. Next, participants saw a contrived 
three-course prix fixe dinner menu that included price information on the computer 
screen. I then told participants that the restaurant had adopted a mandatory service 
gratuity policy rather than voluntary tipping to streamline the service operation and cut 
down serving time, given the time constraints that theater goers often face.  
 I manipulated the surcharge formats as follows. In the built-in gratuity 
condition, participants were presented with one single menu price inclusive of service 
gratuities. Participants in the percentage gratuity condition read a menu price with one 
of the three fixed percentage levels of automatic gratuity whereas those in the dollar 
gratuity condition was shown the same menu price with a fixed automatic gratuity in 
dollar terms.  
 After making one selection from each course and placing a hypothetical order, 
participants responded to several questions on the next screen based on their 
knowledge about the menu. First, participants were asked to indicate their agreement 
on the statement “The pre-theatre dinner provides good value for money” on a Likert-
scale ranging from 1 (very much disagree) to 7 (very much agree). Then they accessed 
the perceived value of the pre-theatre dinner on a seven-point scale anchored by “bad 
deal / good deal.” Answers to these two questions were used to measure deal 
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perception.
1
 To control for the effect of service quality on value judgment, I also 
asked participants to rate their expected level of service quality on a nine-point scale 
anchored by “very poor / very high.” After recalling and writing down the total cost 
for the pre-theatre dinner, participants in the various conditions responded to slightly 
different questions for additional analyses. In the end of the experiment, data about 
participants’ tipping habits and attitudes as well as their demographic information 
were collected.  
 
Results 
 
Deal Evaluations: Full Model 
A deal index was constructed by averaging responses to the two deal 
perception questions (Cronbach’s α = 0.86). Mean deal indices for each condition are 
summarized in Table 1.1. The deal index was initially analyzed using a full factorial 
design of the general liner model (GLM) with surcharge level and surcharge format as 
between-subject factors and the expected level of service quality as a covariate. 
However, the expected service quality turned out to be an insignificant (F (1, 490) 
= .687, p = .408). I hence dropped this variable and conducted a full 3 x 3 between-
participant ANOVA on deal index. As expected, I found a marginally significant two-
way interaction between surcharge level and surcharge format (F (4, 491) = 2.256, p 
                                                 
1
 Participants were also asked to rate the pre-theatre dinner on a 7-point scale from 1 (very cheap) and 7 
(very expensive). I did not include this measure when constructing the deal perception index since it 
tapped more into perceived expensiveness. However, a 3 x 3 ANOVA on the expensiveness perception 
revealed that neither the main effects nor the interaction between surcharge level and surcharge format 
were significant (all ps >.29).  
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= .062).  
Table 1.1: Deal index as a function of surcharge format and surcharge level 
 Percentage service gratuity Dollar service gratuity Built-in service gratuity 
12% 4.57 (n=44) 4.24 (n=61) 3.92 (n=44) 
18% 4.05 (n=52) 4.18 (n=56) 4.47 (n=62) 
23% 3.92 (n=59) 4.10 (n=56) 4.14 (n=66) 
Notes: Mean value of the deal indices with the corresponding number of observations for each 
condition (in parentheses) was indicated in each cell.  
 
Deal Evaluations: Pooled Model 
Before testing the specific predictions, I wanted to find out whether the 18% 
service gratuity induced different responses among participants than did the 23% 
service gratuity. An ANOVA analysis with the 18% and 23% surcharge conditions 
alone from the full model indicated that neither the main effects nor the interaction 
between surcharge format and surcharge level were significant (all ps > .18). I hence 
collapsed the data for 18% and 23% service gratuities to represent the surcharge level 
above the 15% benchmark. The surcharge level below the standard 15% remained as 
12%. A 2 (surcharge level: below vs. above 15%) x 3 (surcharge format: percentage y 
vs. dollar vs. built-in service gratuity) between-subject ANOVA on deal index with 
the pooled model revealed a significant two-way interaction only (F (4, 494) = 4.232, 
p = .015). The two hypotheses were tested in a series of interaction contrasts and post 
hoc comparisons using error term from this omnibus ANOVA (Keppel & Wickens, 
2004). 
 
Deal Evaluations: Percentage vs. Built-in Service Gratuity (Pooled Model) 
To test hypothesis 1, I considered percentage and built-in gratuity conditions 
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alone and analyzed the deal index as a function of surcharge level (below vs. above 
15%) and surcharge format (percentage vs. built-in service gratuity) (please see figure 
1.2). The results yielded a significant two-way interaction only (F (1, 491) = 8.455, p 
= .004). 
As expected, menu prices with a percentage service gratuity (M = 4.57) led to 
a better deal perception than equivalent all-inclusive prices (M = 3.92) when the 
gratuity level is below the standard 15% level (F (1, 491) = 5.244, p = .022). However, 
the relationship was reversed when the gratuity level is above the standard 15% level 
(M = 3.98 vs. M = 4.30; F (1, 491) = 3.349, p = .068). Therefore, hypothesis 1 was 
supported.
 
Figure 1.2: Deal index comparison: percentage vs. built-in gratuity   
 An implied premise for hypothesis 1 is that, for all-inclusive menu prices, 
consumers may assume that the level of the built-in service gratuity is similar to the 15% 
benchmark. I therefore asked participants in the built-in service gratuity condition to 
indicate their expected percentage level of serviced gratuity hidden in the all-inclusive 
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menu prices. For the 167 valid responses, the average level of the expected built-in 
gratuity was 13.28% with a standard deviation of 6.44%. Both the median and the 
mode (49 out of 167) were 15%. The interquartile range (IQR) was 8% (18%-10%).  
These descriptive statistics combined suggested that, without explicit information 
about the included service gratuity, most participants in the built-in service gratuity 
condition indeed tended to assume a gratuity level close to the standard 15%. 
 To rule out the possibility that the observed pattern of deal perception was led 
by consideration of the total cost rather than the partitioned surcharges, an ANOVA 
was also performed on participants’ recalled total cost for the pooled model with 
percentage and built-in service gratuity conditions alone. Given the open-ended 
response format for the recalled total cost, I first identified 31 outliers using the 1.5 x 
IQR criterion and then winsorized the data. The transformed recalled total cost ranged 
from $24.11 to $45.15 with a mean of $34.37 and a mode of $32.00. The 2 (surcharge 
level: below vs. above 15%) x 2 (surcharge format: percentage vs. built-in service 
gratuity) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of surcharge format ((F (1, 490) = 
107.736, p < .001) and a marginally significant main effect of surcharge level ((F (1, 
490) = 3.363, p = .067), qualified by a significant interaction between them ((F (1, 490) 
= 4.527, p = .034). 
Simple effect comparisons indicated that participants in the built-in service 
gratuity condition recalled a lower total cost when the surcharge is below 15% level 
(M = 36.14) than it is above 15% level (M = 37.79; F (1, 490) = 8.000, p = .005). In 
contrast, participant exposed to the percentage service gratuity recalled similar total 
price regardless of the surcharge levels (M = 32.71 vs. M = 32.58; F (1, 490) = .042, p 
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= .838) (please see figure 1.3). Since the interaction pattern between surcharge format 
and surcharge level is different for participants’ recalled total cost than that for their 
value indices, it is unlikely that recalled total cost was the driver for participants’ value 
perception.
2
  
 
Figure 1.3: Recalled total cost comparison: percentage vs. built-in gratuity  
  
Deal Evaluations: Percentage vs. Dollar Service Gratuity (Pooled Model) 
 A 2 (surcharge level: below vs. about 15%) x 2 (surcharge format: percentage 
vs. dollar service gratuity) ANOVA on deal indices for the pooled model under  
percentage and dollar service gratuity conditions alone yielded a significant main 
effect of surcharge level ((F (1, 491) = 4.680, p = .031) and a non-significant main 
effect of surcharge format ((F (1, 491) = .302, p = .583). In addition, the interaction 
                                                 
2
 In a follow-up regression analysis on the percentage gratuity condition alone, the recalled total cost 
had a non-significant effect on the deal index (t = -.550, p = .583), suggesting that it is unlikely to 
mediate the relationship between surcharge level and deal perception. 
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between the two factors ((F (1, 491) = 2.361, p = .125) was consistent with the 
expected pattern and achieved marginal significance with one-tailed p value. The 
followed-up simple effect comparisons on each surcharge format (please see figure 1.4) 
indicated that participants exposed to percentage service gratuity perceived the menu 
price with a below 15% service gratuity (M = 4.57) as a better deal than that with an 
above15% service gratuity (M = 3.98; (F (1, 491) = 6.152, p = .013). In contrast, there 
was no significant difference below and above the standard 15% on deal evaluation in 
the dollar service gratuity condition (M = 4.24 vs. M = 4.14; (F (1, 491) = .221, p 
= .638). 
 
Figure 1.4: Deal index comparison: percentage vs. dollar gratuities  
 
Discussion and Implication  
The main purpose of this research was to examine the influence of price 
partitioning on deal perception and the moderating effect of surcharge level relative to 
its reference in a prix fixe menu context. Consistent with previous research, results 
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from an online experiment demonstrated that participants responded differently to prix 
fixe menu prices with a separately listed percentage service gratuity than they did to 
the corresponding all-inclusive menu prices (where service gratuity was built into the 
menu price). More important, our findings suggested that surcharge levels moderated 
the relationship between surcharge format and deal perception. When service gratuity 
was above the standard 15%, participants perceived a menu price with a separately 
stated percentage gratuity as a lesser deal than did those who saw an equivalent all-
inclusive menu price. In contrast, when service gratuity was below the standard 15%, 
participants regarded a menu price with a separately stated percentage gratuity as a 
better deal than did their counterparts exposed to a corresponding all-inclusive menu 
price.  
I hypothesized that the moderating effect of surcharge level was due to the fact 
that percentage service gratuities have greater evaluability than dish prices. Thus, 
percentage gratuities different from the standard 15% received more decision weights 
than other less evaluable price components and became the main driver of participants’ 
deal perception. To provide support for my claim and rule out an alternative 
explanation, I further showed that price partitioning led to lower recalled total costs 
than equivalent all-inclusive prices across surcharge levels. However, lower recalled 
total expenses didn’t necessarily translate into better deal perception. In particular, 
when service gratuities were above 15%, participants’ deal perception on the 
partitioned menu price was shaped more by the hefty surcharges than the low recalled 
total costs.  
I also explored the potential faming effect of surcharge format on deal 
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perception. Based on the notion of price evaluability, I believed that consumers have 
to convert a dollar service gratuity to the corresponding percentage term if they want 
to evaluate it properly. Because of the difficulties associated with mental calculation, 
consumers are likely to resort to a converting process where they compare the 
observed dollar gratuity with the dollar amount of 15% gratuity and adjust the 15% 
level upward or downward based on comparison results. This procedure, however, 
tend to result in a value close to the 15% anchor level. Consequently, participants 
exposed to dollar service gratuities will have a better deal perception when the 
corresponding percentage gratuities are higher than 15%, and vice versa. Although 
data from our experiment followed the predicted pattern, they only produced a 
marginally significant interaction between surcharge format and surcharge level on 
deal perceptions. There are several possible explanations. First, since dollar-
denominated service gratuities have low evaluability, some participants, especially 
those low in need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), may simply choose to 
ignore them or take them for granted. If this is the case, then the converting process 
did not happen at all and their deal perceptions should be driven by other relatively 
more evaluable price information such as the food price or the total price.  
Second, participants who did make the calculation against percentages may not 
necessarily anchor on the standard 15% as I proposed. When choosing a starting 
percentage gratuity level to convert the dollar gratuity, some participants may apply 
their typical tip level, others may use their expected percentage gratuity for restaurants 
with automatic service charges, still others may simply use 10% or 20% for ease of 
calculation. Although participants may follow the same anchoring-and-adjustment 
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process as I hypothesized, different anchoring values will give rise to offsetting effects 
because the final values are always biased toward the anchors.
3
  
Finally, some researchers argued that presenting price with a “$” sign may 
increase the semantic salience of the price and bring about negative reactions (Kim & 
Kachersky, 2006; Yang, Kimes, & Sessarego, 2009). It follows that a dollar gratuity, 
with its affixed dollar sign, may dampen deal perception relative to comparable 
percentage gratuity in this regard. This possibility may also contribute to the 
marginally significant result.  
The findings of the present research have several managerial implications for 
pricing prix fixe menus. Perhaps the most important implication is that restaurant 
operators should avoid imposing service gratuities that exceed the standard 15% 
separately on prix fixe menus. As shown in the study, consumers’ negative reactions to 
the higher-than-average service gratuities reduced the overall attractiveness of a prix 
fixe deal.  
Second, this research suggested that if an operator needs (or wants) to impose a 
service gratuity above the standard 15%, it would be wise to present an all-inclusive 
price. As I discussed earlier, some restaurants are compelled to charge higher than 
normal service gratuities for prix fixes because these meals entail substantial service. 
Other restaurants may simply hope to sweeten their prix fixe deals and attract 
customers by discounting food items but raising the accompanying service gratuities 
to maintain profits. Regardless of the motivations behind, they would be better off in 
                                                 
3
 For example, for a dollar gratuity between 10% and 15%, anchoring on 10% and adjusting upward 
will result in a value close to 10% while anchoring on 15% and adjusting downward will result in a 
value close to 15%.  
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terms of deal perception to cover up the true level of service gratuities and present all-
inclusive prices to their customers. In fact, this point has been taken by a growing 
number of restaurants including Per Se, which made the headlines in 2005 by 
initiating automatic service gratuities of 20% on its menus in lieu of voluntary tipping 
(Bly, 2005). Now the restaurant instead prices its two nine-course tasting menus at 
$275 each with service included.  
On the other hand, although findings from the present research indicated that 
restaurants may benefit in terms of consumers’ deal perceptions by listing a service 
gratuity below 15% for their prix fixe menus, several caveats are in order. First, I only 
tested a gratuity level modestly below the standard 15% (i.e., 12%). Therefore, the 
results may not hold up for more extreme values. Second, in the experiment, I 
controlled participants’ service quality perception by explicitly telling them that the 
service quality of the restaurant is satisfactory. In reality, however, stating service 
gratuities below 15% may bring about negative expectations or perceptions of the 
service quality due to consumers’ positive price-quality association (Lichtenstein & 
Burton, 1989; Monroe, 1973; Rao & Monroe, 1989) and eventually spoil the overall 
deal perception.  
        As for whether to present service gratuity as a percentage level or in a dollar 
amount, the results suggested that there was only marginally significant difference 
between the two formats. There is little doubt that a dollar-denominated service 
gratuity tends to hinder participants’ judgment on the surcharge level and hence 
reduce the evaluability of the surcharge. However, consumers may take different 
approaches to deal with this ambiguity other than anchor on the standard 15% and 
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compare its converted dollar amount with the observed dollar gratuity as I proposed. 
Further research is needed to address this complex issue.  
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CHAPTER 2 
DECOMPOSING THE EFFECTS OF VOLUNTARY VERSUS MANDATORY 
SERVICE GRATUITY ON MENU PRICE PERCEPTION AND DEMAND 
 
Introduction 
 Although leaving a 15 to 20 percent voluntary gratuity or tip at table-service 
restaurants is a well-entrenched social norm in the United States, the practice of 
automatically adding service gratuities to customers’ bills has been on the rise in 
recent years. Whereas the shift from instituting voluntary tipping to imposing a 
mandatory service gratuity has fueled a great deal of discussion about the pros and 
cons of each policy in academic journals, trade magazines as well as mass media, most 
of the argument was made from organizational and/or human resources perspectives 
(Bly, 2005; Kwortnik, Lynn, & Ross, 2009; Lynn, Jabbour, & Kim, 2012; Lynn, 
Kwortnik, & Sturman, 2011; Lynn & Withiam, 2008; Vaughan, 2010). The potential 
influence of different surcharge policies for restaurant service on consumer behavior 
and their implications for marketing practice have been largely ignored.   
 The research reported here attempts to address this gap by empirically 
examining consumer reactions to a menu price with 15% customary tipping versus the 
same price with a 15% mandatory service gratuity. I argue that both types of surcharge 
for restaurant service can be broadly viewed as forms of price partitioning. Note that, 
in the former case, the service gratuity is in effect voluntary. Even though the 
restaurant suggests a customary amount of 15% of the pre-tax subtotal according to 
the social norm of tipping, customers themselves ultimately decide whether to tip and 
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how much to tip. In the latter case, however, the service gratuity is compulsory and 
automatically added to the check. Customers must pay the exact amount specified by 
the restaurant.  
 In the context of Sunday brunch flyer evaluation, I showed through three 
online experiments that participants tend to perceive a brunch price with 15% 
customary tipping as less expensive than the same price with a 15% mandatory service 
gratuity. In addition, participants also indicated higher patronage intent for the 
restaurant with voluntary tipping than that with a corresponding mandatory service 
gratuity. More important, I demonstrated that two distinct psychological mechanisms 
underlie the differential impact of voluntary versus mandatory service gratuity on 
consumers’ price evaluation. First, there is a differential processing effect. For the 
same menu price, participants who encounter voluntary tipping are more likely to 
disregard the surcharge information than those who are exposed to equivalent 
mandatory service gratuities. Second, on top of this processing difference, there is a 
differential evaluation effect. In particular, I suggest that even when participants 
similarly attend to and process both types of surcharges, differences in their subjective 
evaluation of restaurant expensiveness can arise because people are inclined to 
perceive voluntary tips as more fair than mandatory service gratuities of comparable 
magnitude.  
In the next section, I first review relevant literature on behavioral pricing and 
develop mediation models that elucidate the effects of voluntary versus mandatory 
service gratuity on consumers’ menu price perception and demand. I then describe 
three online experiments designed to test the hypotheses and evaluate the proposed 
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models. The paper concludes with a discussion on the implications, limitations and 
suggestions for future research.  
 
Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses Development 
Price partitioning refers to the practice of breaking up a single price of a 
product and/or service into a base price plus one or more surcharges and presenting 
them individually to consumers. Previous research on price partitioning has mainly 
focused on contrasting consumer reactions to partitioned versus combined presentation 
of the same price and found strong empirical evidence against the principle of 
description invariance prescribed by standard economics theory (Tversky, Sattath, & 
Slovic, 1988). In particular, it has been shown that presenting the price of an offer in 
separate parts rather than as a consolidated whole influences price evaluation and 
choice. 
However, it remains unclear whether replacing the voluntary surcharge of a 
partitioned price with an equivalent mandatory fee will affect consumers’ price 
perception and demand. Conceivably, consumers may opt to pay significantly less 
when the surcharge is discretionary than when it is compulsory. As a result, the total 
purchase costs with a voluntary surcharge tend to be lower than those with a 
mandatory one. This is not always the case, however, for restaurant service gratuities. 
Although restaurant patrons could leave any amount of or even no tip when service 
gratuity is voluntary, the social norm of tipping often prompts them to tip within the 
standard 15 to 20 percent for satisfactory service. Given that the majority of 
mandatory service gratuities at restaurants also fall within the same range, the critical 
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difference between the two pricing policies hence lies in the voluntary versus non-
voluntary nature of the surcharge rather than the level of the surcharge.  
To answer the question of whether and why presenting a 15% surcharge for the 
same menu price as either a customary tip or a mandatory service gratuity will induce 
different consumer reactions, I drew on extant research on behavioral pricing and 
proposed two distinct psychological mechanisms that may mediate the framing effect 
of voluntary versus mandatory surcharge on price evaluation. First, I maintain that 
consumers are more likely to disregard a 15% surcharge for restaurant service as a 
customary tip than as a mandatory service gratuity in their price evaluation. It has been 
shown that people are prone to attend to and process the secondary price component 
(i.e., the surcharge) of a partitioned price inadequately, especially when they are 
presented as a percentage of the primary price component (i.e., the base price) 
(Estelami, 1999; Morwitz, Greenleaf, & Johnson, 1998; Xia & Monroe, 2004). This is 
because integrating the percentage surcharge with the base price involves both 
multiplication and addition and hence requires more cognitive efforts than consumers 
want to spend (Estelami, 1999). Instead, they are likely to ignore the surcharges or use 
mental shortcuts such as anchoring and adjustment to process partitioned prices 
(Morwitz et al., 1998). It follows that the percentage presentation of the surcharge 
should render both voluntary tips and mandatory service gratuities susceptible to 
selective attention and heuristic processing. I argue, however, that voluntary tips tend 
to be less salient than comparable mandatory service gratuities in other aspects, 
making them even more elusive in price judgment.  
In a conceptual paper, Kim and Kachersky (2006) proposed four key 
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dimensions of price salience and suggested that, in a multi-dimensional price, the 
amount of attention paid to the surcharge will contingent on its relative salience to the 
primary price component. Based on their framework, I believe that voluntary tips tend 
to be less salient both visually and semantically than the corresponding mandatory 
service gratuities for the same menu price. First of all, because voluntary tipping is the 
norm, restaurants complying with this convention often make no mention of tipping 
policy on their menus and advertising flyers. On the other hand, restaurants that 
choose to implement mandatory service gratuities instead of tipping are strongly 
recommended having a stated surcharge policy in place to ensure that customers pay 
due attention to it and thus they are not caught off guard by forced tipping. 
Consequently, mandatory service gratuities tend to be more visually prominent than 
voluntary tipping and hence should command more attention. Second, even holding 
difference in visual salience constant as I did in the studies
4
, consumers are still more 
likely to direct their attention to mandatory rather than voluntary surcharges. This is 
because the two types of surcharges also differ in specific wording. According to 
(Berlyne, 1960), words like “mandatory”, “obligatory” or “required” may operate as 
conditional indicating stimuli that alert people to re-focus their attention. Finally, 
research in social psychology suggests that salience is often produced by novelty and 
unexpectedness. Therefore, when mandatory service gratuities disconfirm people’s 
expectation of the tipping norm, they should draw greater attention.  
 Another possible reason why consumers tend to ignore surcharges more often 
                                                 
4
 In order to control individual differences in tipping propensity, in the voluntary tipping condition, I 
employed a clearly stated 15% customary tipping policy. This manipulation thus may equate the visual 
salience between voluntary and mandatory service gratuities.  
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under voluntary tipping than under mandatory gratuities is that they may find 
voluntary tips, but not mandatory service gratuities, irrelevant to price judgment. 
Some researchers suggested that perceived expensiveness is a market-framed 
evaluation (Garbarino & Slonim, 2003). According to the compatibility principle 
(Tversky et al., 1988), people assign more weight on input information that is framed 
similar to the output measure. Consequently, when asked to evaluate the 
expensiveness of a product’s price, consumers are more likely to use market-level 
information such as the fair price of the product and less likely to consider personal-
level information such as their individual preferences. Following this line of reasoning, 
I suppose that consumers are likely to take into account mandatory service gratuities 
when they evaluate menu prices. This is because these compulsory surcharges, like the 
menu prices they attach to, are determined by the restaurants and hence represent 
market behavior. On the other hand, the voluntary tips consumers opt to leave are less 
likely to influence their perceived expensiveness of the menu price because how much 
to tip is essentially a personal decision or individual propensity. Based on the above 
discussion I propose that:  
H1: Given the same menu price, consumers are more likely to disregard the 
surcharge under 15% customary tipping than under a 15% mandatory service 
gratuity.  
Over and above the perceptual and processing differences, I propose that 
consumers also diverge in their evaluative judgments on voluntary versus mandatory 
surcharge for restaurant service. In particular, I claim that consumers tend to perceive 
a 15% surcharge framed as a customary tip as more fair than that framed as a 
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mandatory service gratuity.  
Price fairness refers to the judgment of whether a price is reasonable, 
acceptable, or justifiable (Bolton, Warlop, & Alba, 2003; Lichtenstein & Bearden, 
1989; Xia, Monroe, & Cox, 2004). Prior research on price partitioning has 
demonstrated that the relative magnitude of the surcharge to the base price negatively 
influences the perceived fairness of the surcharge (Cheema, 2008; Sheng, Bao, & Pan, 
2007). In the current research, however, differences in perceived fairness between 
voluntary and mandatory service gratuity cannot be attributed to the surcharge level 
because I hold it constant at 15% of the menu price. Instead, I believe that the 
differential fairness perceptions on the two types of surcharges may stem from several 
other factors.  
First, consumers may perceive mandatory service gratuities as less fair than the 
corresponding customary tips because voluntary tipping is the common practice in the 
restaurant industry. It has been suggested that industry norms, even those appear 
somewhat random, contribute positively to consumers’ fairness perception (Heyman 
& Mellers, 2008). Consequently, everything else being equal, a deviation from 
industry norms should reduce consumer fairness perception. Second, a shift from 
voluntary tipping to mandatory gratuities is likely to jeopardize consumers’ sense of 
power and control in the transaction. Research on participative pricing such as 
auctions and name your own price (NYOP) has shown that consumers have greater 
fairness perceptions when they play a role in the price-setting process than when the 
seller sets the prices (Chandran & Morwitz, 2005; Haws & Bearden, 2006). Because 
voluntary tipping affords consumers the discretionary power to decide on the amount 
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of surcharge for restaurant service whereas mandatory service gratuities deprive 
consumers of this authority, I suggest that consumers will find voluntary tipping as 
more fair than the corresponding mandatory service gratuities.  
H2: Given the same menu price, consumers perceive the 15% surcharge for 
restaurant service under voluntary tipping as more fair than under mandatory 
gratuities. 
Based on the above discussion, I put forward a parallel mediation model that 
helps us to predict and explain the differential effects of voluntary versus mandatory 
service gratuity on menu price perception. First, in the information processing process, 
I maintain that consumers are more likely to ignore voluntary tipping than mandatory 
service gratuities of comparable magnitude. Thus, on the aggregate level, those 
exposed to 15% customary tipping will perceive the same menu price as lower or less 
expensive than those exposed to a 15% mandatory service gratuity.  
H3: Consumers’ use (or lack thereof) of surcharge information when they 
evaluate a partitioned price enhances (reduces) their expensiveness 
perceptions. 
Second, in the information evaluation process, I propose that consumers tend 
to have greater fairness perceptions on 15% customary tipping than on 15% 
mandatory service gratuities for the same menu price. Extant research has suggested 
that consumers are more price sensitive and feel more “pain of paying” when the price 
is perceived as less fair(Schindler, Morrin, & Bechwati, 2005; Sinha & Batra, 1999). 
Consequently, I argue that consumers’ perception of price expensiveness will be 
negatively influenced by their perception of price fairness.  
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H4: Consumers’ perceived fairness on the surcharge negatively influences 
their perceived expensiveness of a partitioned price.    
 Taken together, the preceding four hypotheses comprise my parallel mediation 
model of perceived menu price expensiveness as summarized in H5 and showed in 
Figure 3.1 below.  
H5: Consumers’ use of surcharge information in price evaluation and 
perceived surcharge policy fairness mediate the relationship between 
surcharge policy and the perceived expensiveness of a partitioned price such 
that menu prices with 15% customary tipping will be perceived as less 
expensive than those with a 15% mandatory service gratuity.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 The parallel mediation model of perceived menu price expensiveness 
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their patronage intent. Previous studies have demonstrated that perceived fairness of 
the surcharge can increase willingness to bid and purchase likelihood (Haws & 
Bearden, 2006; Sheng et al., 2007). Accordingly, holding all other factors constant, 
consumers are more likely to go to restaurants with 15% customary tipping than those 
with a 15% mandatory service gratuity because they consider the formers’ surcharge 
policy more fair. In addition, the more favorable price perception associated with 15% 
customary tipping may translate into a higher demand as suggested by previous 
studies (Morwitz et al., 1998). I accordingly propose that: 
H6: Consumers’ perceived fairness on the surcharge of a partitioned price 
positively influences their patronage intent. 
H7: Consumers’ perceived expensiveness on a partitioned price negatively 
influences their patronage intent.    
 All in all, the above hypotheses together comprise my mediation model of 
patronage intent, as shown in Figure 3.2 and summarized in H8 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 The mediation model of patronage intent 
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 H8: Consumers’ perceived surcharge policy fairness and perceived 
 expensiveness of a partitioned price mediate the relationship between 
 surcharge policy and their patronage intent such that they are more likely go 
 to the restaurant with 15% customary tipping than that with a 15% mandatory 
 service gratuity for the same menu price. 
 
Study 1 
Study 1 was primarily designed to demonstrate the differential effects of 
different surcharge policies on price perception. Specifically, I expect that consumers 
perceive a menu price with 15% customary tipping as less expensive than the same 
price with a 15% mandatory service gratuity. Although not the focus of the current 
research, the effect of price partitioning relative to price consolidating was also 
examined in this study. Previous research has shown that partitioned prices often lead 
to better price perception than comparable consolidated prices (Lee & Han, 2002; 
Morwitz et al., 1998; Xia & Monroe, 2004). I tested the robustness of this finding in 
Study 1 by comparing two different types of partitioned menu prices with the 
corresponding all-inclusive menu prices. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
I recruited participants for all three studies through Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk (www.MTurk.com). Although still in its infancy, MTurk has gained increasing 
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popularity among psychology and other social science researchers in recent years and 
proved to be a good source to obtain high-quality data inexpensively and quickly 
(Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011).   
Two hundred and seventy participants responded to a job listing (a.k.a. HIT) 
on MTurk website to take a short online survey about the effectiveness of restaurant 
advertising flyers. They were paid a small amount of money for participating in the 
study.
5
 Forty-six of them did not complete the survey and were excluded from the 
analyses. Out of the 224 participants included in the analyses, 50% were men and 82% 
were Caucasian. Their ages ranged from 18 to 65, with the average being 31.32. 
Slightly less than half of the participants (i.e., 45%) were college graduates. Twenty-
five percent of the participants reported a household income less than $25,000 a year, 
35% reported between $25,001 and $50,000, 31% reported between $50,001 and 
$100,000, and 9% reported more than $100,000 a year. Their average dining out 
frequency at full-service restaurants was four times per month, with a low response of 
zero time per month and a high response of 20 times per month. Thus, this sample 
represented a diverse set of restaurant patrons. 
 
Design and Procedure 
Participants in Study 1 were required to imagine that they want to have a 
brunch in the coming Sunday and that they are considering to choose from two local 
restaurants famous for Sunday brunches. They were told that they have never been to 
either restaurant before but have heard that the quality of food and service at both 
                                                 
5
 Across the three studies I paid participants 25 to 50 cents for their responses.  
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restaurants is pretty good. Next, participants were shown the Sunday brunch flyer for 
each of the two restaurants sequentially on the computer screen. Each flyer contains 
basic information about the Sunday brunch at respective restaurant including the 
featured food items, price with any applicable surcharges, starting and ending times as 
well as the address and reservation number. The flyer is text-only without any pictures 
of food items or the exterior/interior views of the restaurant (please see appendix for 
the experiment stimuli of Study 1).  
The Sunday brunch flyer of restaurant A was identical across all participants 
and was used to establish a baseline condition for the subsequent evaluation of the 
Sunday brunch flyer of restaurant B. The Sunday brunch at restaurant A is priced at 
$9.75 per person with no mention of any surcharges, hence implying that voluntary 
tipping norm applies at that restaurant. The Sunday brunch flyer for restaurant B 
varied across participants with regard to surcharge policies. For about one-third of the 
participants, the Sunday brunch at restaurant B is priced at $8.95 per person plus 15% 
automatic service gratuity. For the other one-third of the participants, they were 
presented with the same brunch price, but told that tipping is voluntary and it is 
customary for restaurant patrons to leave 15% as tips. Finally, the rest of the 
participants saw a consolidated price of “$10.25 per person inclusive of gratuity (no 
tipping allowed)”, which is about 15% higher than the $8.95 brunch price in the other 
two conditions
6
.  
After reading each flyer, participants were first requested to state their 
perception of restaurant expensiveness on a two-item, 7-point Likert scale ranging 
                                                 
6
 The equivalent consolidated price for $8.95 plus 15% surcharge is $10.29. Because I want to use 5-
ending prices for all conditions, I adjusted the service-inclusive price downward to $10.25.  
 48 
from 1 (extremely inexpensive/extremely low-priced) to 7 (extremely 
expensive/extremely high-priced). Next participants indicated the likelihood of going 
the restaurant for Sunday brunch on a 7-point Likert scale with 1 = very unlikely and 7 
= very likely. I then asked participates to rate their expected quality of food and 
service for the Sunday brunch on a 7-point scale anchored by “very poor / very high” 
as well as evaluate the attractiveness of the flyer on a 7-point scale anchored by “very 
unattractive / very attractive”. The perceived quality measure was used as a covariate 
to control for consumers’ price-quality association in the subsequent analyses. The 
flyer evaluation measure served as a filler question consistent with the flyer evaluation 
cover story. Finally, for the flyer of restaurant B, participants were asked to identify 
the surcharge policy used at that restaurant. In the end of the survey, data about 
participants’ tipping habits and attitudes as well as their demographic information 
were collected (please see appendix for the questionnaire of Study 1). 
 
Results 
 
Manipulation Checks 
 About 79% (176 out of 224) participants correctly identified the surcharge 
policy at restaurant B, suggesting that the majority of participants attended to the 
surcharge information in restaurant B’s flyer. Hence the manipulation was successful 
in producing the intended differences in perceived surcharge policies.  
 
The Influence of Individual Tipping Propensity on Perceived Expensiveness 
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 To investigate the potential influence of individual tipping propensity on 
perceived expensiveness, I asked participants to indicate their typical tip size in 
percentage in the end of the survey. Given the open-ended response format, I 
examined whether there were problematic data such as extreme outliers. I first 
manually corrected invalid input that can be ascribed to format mix-ups.
7
 I then 
recoded two unrealistically large tip percentages (70 and 80 percent) as 30%. The 
transformed typical tip sizes thus ranged from 5% to 30% with a mean of 17% and a 
mode of 20%. Finally, I standardized the typical tip size with a mean of zero for the 
analyses reported below.  
 First, it could be argued that big tippers, probably due to their higher income 
level, are less sensitive to menu prices than small tippers. Therefore, for participants in 
all conditions, I expected a negative correlation between individual tipping propensity 
and perceived menu price expensiveness. However, the data showed that the 
correlation between typical tip size and perceived expensiveness of restaurant B was 
not significant (r = -.082, n = 224, p = .22). 
 Second, recall that in order to control individual differences in tipping 
propensity so that discrepancies in perceived expensiveness among surcharge policies 
cannot be attributed to factors other than the nature of the surcharge, I used 15% 
customary tipping in the voluntary condition. However, it is possible that participants 
exposed to 15% customary tipping ignore the suggested 15% gratuity level and assess 
the expensiveness of the menu price based on individual typical tip size. If this is the 
case, individual tipping propensity should moderate the relationship between 
                                                 
7
 For example, one participant entered 0.2 for his/her typical tipping percentage level. I changed 0.2 to 
20, assuming that the participants did not pay attention to the “percent” following the text entry filed.  
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surcharge policy and perceived expensiveness such that participants perceive brunch 
prices with 15% customary tipping as more expensive than those with 15% mandatory 
service gratuity or corresponding service-inclusive prices the greater their reported 
typical tip size. To examine this possibility, I regressed the expensiveness ratings of 
restaurant B on typical tip size and surcharge policy (dummy coded so that each was 
contrasted with 15% customary tipping). Perceived expensiveness of restaurant A 
(Cronbach’s α = 0.90) was included as a covariate. The interaction terms between 
typical tip size and surcharge policy dummies were then added to the model. The main 
effects model accounted for 47.9% of the variance in the dependent variable and 
produced significant effects for 15% mandatory service gratuity (B = .345, t(219) = 
2.338, p = .02) and service-inclusive prices dummies (B = .948, t(219) = 6.36, p 
< .001) as well as the perceived expensiveness of restaurant A (B = .694, t(219) = 
12.686, p < .001). However, the coefficient for typical tip size was not significant (B = 
-.056, t(219) = -.926, p = .356). In addition, for the full model, none of the interactions 
between typical tip size and the surcharge policy dummies reached statistical 
significance (all ps > .24).  
 Taken together, the data suggested that individual tipping propensity had no 
influence on participants’ price perception and that participants in the 15% customary 
tipping condition do not seem to use their typical tip size in place of the suggested 15% 
tipping level when evaluating the expensiveness of the Sunday brunch. I hence 
dropped this variable in subsequent analyses.  
 
The Differential Effects of Surcharge Policy on Perceived Expensiveness  
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 As discussed earlier, in order to adjust for the baseline difference in price 
perception among participants, I collected their perceived expensiveness ratings on 
restaurant A and used it as a covariate for analyses on perceived expensiveness of 
restaurant B. However, consumers may also use simple heuristics to gauge their price 
perception. For example, there is some evidence suggesting that the majority of 
restaurants impose mandatory service gratuities in lieu of voluntary tipping tend to be 
upscale establishments. If consumers associate mandatory service gratuities with high-
end restaurants, this association may influence their perceived expensiveness of the 
menu price. To control the effect of surcharge policy-restaurant class association on 
price perception, I asked participants, in the end of the survey, to indicate whether 
voluntary tipping, 15% mandatory service gratuity and service-inclusive prices are 
more common among upscale restaurants than among less expensive ones respectively. 
Their answers to these questions, together with their perceived expensiveness ratings 
on restaurant A and the expected quality for restaurant B, were all included as 
covariates in an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with perceived expensiveness of 
restaurant B (Cronbach’s α = 0.88) as the dependent variable and surcharge policy as 
the independent variable (please see table 2.1). I sequentially removed the non-
significant covariates in the initial model and the only significant one remaining in the 
final model was participants’ perceived expensiveness ratings on restaurant A (F (1, 
220) = 163.418, p < .001, 2p  = .426). 
 Results from the final ANCOVA model revealed a significant difference in 
perceived expensiveness of restaurant B among three different surcharge polices (F (2, 
220) = 20.60, p < .001, 2p  = .158). Planned contrasts were used to examine the 
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differential effects of surcharge policy as well as the positive impact of price 
partitioning over price consolidating on menu price perception. First, in line with my 
expectation, participants perceived a Sunday brunch price with 15% customary tipping 
 
 
Table 2.1 One-way ANCOVA of perceived expensiveness (initial model)  
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:PercExpensivenessB 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 169.337a 7 24.191 29.639 .000 .490 
Intercept .603 1 .603 .739 .391 .003 
PercExpensivenessA 126.701 1 126.701 155.236 .000 .418 
VTupscale 2.184 1 2.184 2.675 .103 .012 
AGupscale .092 1 .092 .112 .738 .001 
GIupscale .000 1 .000 .000 .984 .000 
QualityExpect 1.750 1 1.750 2.145 .145 .010 
cond 31.324 2 15.662 19.189 .000 .151 
Error 176.296 216 .816    
Total 3365.750 224     
Corrected Total 345.633 223     
a. R Squared = .490 (Adjusted R Squared = .473) 
 
 
(M = 3.25) as significantly less expensive than the same price with a mandatory 15% 
service gratuity (M = 3.59; F (1, 220) = 5.574, p = .019, 
2
p  = 0.025). Moreover, 
participants rated the partitioned Sunday brunch prices (M = 3.42, the average 
expensiveness ratings of Sunday brunch prices with 15% customary tipping and those 
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with mandatory 15% service gratuity) as less expensive than comparable service-
inclusive Sunday brunch prices (M = 4.19; F (1, 220) = 35.749,  p < .001, 2p  = 
0.14). This result corroborates previous research on the favorable impact of price 
partitioning on price perception (please see Figure 2.3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 The mean ratings of perceived expensiveness among three different surcharge policies 
for the Sunday brunch 
 
 
Discussion 
 Overall, findings of Study 1 showed strong evidence of the differential effects 
of different surcharge policies on price perception such that participants tend to 
perceive restaurants with 15% customary tipping as less expensive than those with a 
15% mandatory service gratuity in the context of evaluating Sunday brunch flyers. In 
addition, I replicated and extended previous findings of the positive impact of price 
partitioning on price perception by examining partitioned menu prices with either 
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voluntary or mandatory service gratuities and comparing them together with the 
corresponding service-inclusive prices. I also ruled out the alternative explanation that 
differences in perceived expensiveness are a result of simple heuristics associating 
restaurant classes with surcharge policies. Finally, I investigated the potential 
influences of individual tipping propensity on price perception. The data showed that 
participants’ typical tip size did not influence their price perception on the whole and 
that participants in the voluntary tipping condition were unlikely to use individual 
typical tip size when evaluating the menu price.  
 However, in this preliminary study, I merely demonstrated the differential 
effects of voluntary versus mandatory service gratuity on menu price perception but 
did not explore hypotheses about the underlying mechanisms of those effects. 
Therefore, I conducted the following two main studies to investigate why consumers 
diverge in their reactions to different surcharge policies.  
  
Study 2 
The purpose of Study 2 was twofold. The first aim was to test my proposed 
mediation models that underlie the differential effects of voluntary versus mandatory 
service gratuity on menu price perception and demand. Moreover, I want to examine 
whether asking participants’ to estimate the total expense before their price evaluation 
moderates the relationship between surcharge policy and perceived expensiveness. In 
my conceptual model, I argued that one of the two underlying processes, the 
differential processing effect, comes from the fact that consumers tend to ignore 
surcharge information more often under voluntary tipping than under corresponding 
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mandatory service gratuities. Therefore, if I direct participants’ attention to the 
surcharge by asking them to determine total expense before price evaluation, the 
differences in perceived expensiveness between surcharge policies might be attenuated. 
Hence I propose that: 
H9: Whether to ask participants to estimate their total expense before price 
 evaluation moderates the relationship between surcharge policy and perceived 
 price expensiveness.  
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Three hundred and fifteen participants responded to a job listing (a.k.a. HIT) 
on MTurk website to take a short online survey about the effectiveness of restaurant 
advertising flyers. They were paid a trivial amount of money for participating in the 
study. All of them completed the survey. Of the participants, 58% were men and 76% 
were Caucasian. Their ages ranged from 18 to 75, with the average being 39.56. 
Slightly less than half of the participants (i.e., 45%) were college graduates. Twenty-
five percent of the participants reported a household income less than $25,000 a year, 
34% reported between $25,001 and $50,000, 31% reported between $50,001 and 
$100,000, and 10% reported more than $100,000 a year. Their average dining out 
frequency at full-service restaurants was four times per month, with a low response of 
zero time per month and a high response of 20 times per month. Thus, the profile of 
participants in Study 2 is very similar to that of Study 1. 
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Design and Procedure 
The experiment stimuli of Study 2 (please see appendix) were almost identical 
to those of Study 1, with only some minor changes to eliminate potential ambiguities.
8
 
The study was a 2 (surcharge policy for restaurant B: 15% customary tipping vs. 15% 
mandatory service gratuity) x 2 (the total expense awareness: presence vs. absence) 
between-participants design. In addition to the surcharge policy manipulation similar 
to that of Study 1, I asked half of the participants to determine their total spending, 
including any applicable tips or gratuities, if they went to restaurant B’s Sunday 
brunch alone before they evaluated the expensiveness of that Sunday brunch. The 
other half was not presented with this question and reported their expensiveness 
ratings of restaurant B right after they saw the brunch flyer. The purpose of this 
manipulation was to examine whether reducing processing biases attenuates the 
difference in participants’ perceived expensiveness ratings between the two surcharge 
policies. I suppose that asking participants to determine the total expenditure will 
channel their attention to both the brunch price and the surcharge information, 
regardless of whether the surcharge is a customary tip or a mandatory service gratuity. 
This directed focus on the total expense hence potentially makes participants more 
likely to use both price components in their price evaluation across surcharge policies. 
As a result, the differences in price perception between the two surcharge policies may 
be smaller when participants are made aware of the total expense than when they are 
not. 
                                                 
8
 Based on the feedbacks from Study 1, I made changes to both flyers so that it is crystal clear to the 
participants that both restaurants offer “all-you-can-eat” style brunches including soft drinks. I also 
changed the heading of both flyers so they appealed more equally to participants.  
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Participants in Study 2 went through a procedure similar to that of Study 1. 
They were shown the Sunday brunch flyers for restaurant A and restaurant B in order 
on the computer screen and asked to answer some questions after reading each flyer. 
To explore psychological mechanisms underlying the differential effects of surcharge 
policy on price perception and demand, I included some additional process measures 
for restaurant B’s evaluation. First, participants were asked to choose whether their 
expensiveness ratings for the Sunday brunch at restaurant B was based on the $8.95 
brunch price only, any applicable tips/surcharges only, or the total expense (i.e., the 
$8.95 brunch price plus any applicable tips/surcharges). Second, I asked participants 
to allocate 10 chips between the $8.95 brunch price and the surcharge (i.e., the amount 
of tip they voluntarily leave or the 15% mandatory service gratuity) to reflect the 
importance of each price component in their expensiveness assessments. Finally, 
participants’ fairness perceptions on the surcharge policy used by restaurant B were 
collected using a 3-item 7-point semantic differential scale (unfair/fair, 
unreasonable/reasonable, unjustified/justified) adopted from previous research 
(Maxwell, 2002; Sheng et al., 2007). As a manipulation check, I again asked 
participants to identify the surcharge policy used at restaurant B (please see appendix 
for the questionnaire).  
 
Results 
 
Manipulation Check 
 I asked respondents to identify the surcharge policy used by restaurant B.  
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About 89% (281 out of 315) participants chose the right surcharge policy. 
Consequently, I conclude that the manipulation was successful in producing the 
intended differences in perceived surcharge policies.  
 
The Influence of Individual Tipping Propensity on Perceived Expensiveness 
 To check the potential impact of individual tipping propensity on perceived 
expensiveness, I conducted similar analyses as in Study 1. I first calculated the 
correlation between participants’ typical tip size and their perceived expensiveness of 
restaurant B. I then regressed the expensiveness ratings of restaurant B on typical tip 
size, the 15% mandatory service gratuity dummy, the total expense awareness dummy 
as well as the perceived expensiveness of restaurant A (Cronbach’s α = .90). The 
interaction terms between typical tip size, surcharge policy and total recall awareness 
dummies were then added to the model.  
 As expected, for participants across all conditions, there was a significant 
negative correlation between typical tip size and perceived expensiveness of restaurant 
B (r = -.189, n = 315, p < .001). The main effects model produced significant effects 
for 15% mandatory service gratuity (B = .278, t(310) = 2.724, p = .007) and perceived 
expensiveness of restaurant A (B = .756, t(310) = 16.537, p < .001), a marginally 
significant effect for typical tip size (B = -.098, t(310) = -1.883, p = .061), and a non-
significant effect for the total expense awareness dummy (B = .158, t(310) = 1.552, p 
= .122). Thus, although I found a significant negative correlation between typical tip 
size and perceived expensiveness, regression results from the main effects model 
indicated that the influence of individual tipping propensity on price perception was 
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limited when perceived expensiveness of restaurant A was included as a covariate. 
Furthermore, all interaction terms from the full model, including the one between 
typical tip size and the 15% mandatory service gratuity dummy variable, did not reach 
statistical significance (all ps > .11), suggesting that participants in the 15% customary 
tipping condition do not appear to use their typical tip size in their price evaluation. 
Based on these findings, I dropped tipping propensity in subsequent analyses.  
The Moderating Role of Total Expense Awareness on Perceived Expensiveness 
 A 2 (surcharge policy) x 2 (the total expense awareness) ANCOVA on 
perceived expensiveness of restaurant B (Cronbach’s α = .96) with surcharge policy 
and the total expense awareness as independent variables and perceived expensiveness 
of restaurant A, the expected quality of restaurant B as well as the three surcharge 
policy-upscale restaurant association ratings as covariates indicated that many of the 
covariates are not significant (please see table 2.2). I removed non-significant 
covariates in succession and in the end only participants’ perceived expensiveness 
ratings on restaurant A remained significant (F (1, 310) = 289.13, p < .001, 2p  
= .483). The final ANCOVA model revealed a significant main effect of surcharge 
policy only such that participants perceived brunch price with 15% customary tipping 
(M = 3.41) as less expensive than the same price with a 15% mandatory service 
gratuity (M = 3.70) at restaurant B (F (1, 310) = 7.71, p < .01, 2p  = .024). Neither 
the main effect for the total expense awareness (F (1, 310) = 1.87, p = .173, 2p  
= .006) nor its interaction with surcharge policy (F (1, 310) = 1.497, p = .222, 2p  
= .005) reached statistical significance. Therefore, the moderating role of the total 
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expense awareness on perceived expensiveness (H9) was not supported and I 
collapsed the data across the total expense awareness conditions in the mediation 
analyses.  
 
 
Table 2.2 Two-way ANCOVA of perceived expensiveness (initial model) 
  
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:PercExpensive 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 262.166a 8 32.771 40.530 .000 .514 
Intercept .359 1 .359 .444 .505 .001 
PercExpensiveA 208.225 1 208.225 257.529 .000 .457 
QualityExpt 3.081 1 3.081 3.810 .052 .012 
VTupscale 1.971 1 1.971 2.438 .119 .008 
AGupscale .192 1 .192 .237 .627 .001 
GIupscale .009 1 .009 .011 .918 .000 
SurPolicy 7.142 1 7.142 8.834 .003 .028 
TEalert 1.451 1 1.451 1.795 .181 .006 
SurPolicy * TEalert 1.232 1 1.232 1.524 .218 .005 
Error 247.417 306 .809    
Total 4488.250 315     
Corrected Total 509.583 314     
a. R Squared = .514 (Adjusted R Squared = .502) 
 
 
Use of Surcharge in Price Evaluation  
Evaluation Weight. Recalled that participants were asked to split 10 chips  
between the two price components (the base price and the surcharge) to mirror the 
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weights they assigned to each price component in their price evaluation. A 2 
(surcharge policy) x 2 (the total expense awareness) ANOVA on the number of chips 
participants assigned to surcharge (i.e., the amount of tip they voluntarily leave or the 
15% mandatory service gratuity) revealed a main effect of surcharge policy only such 
that the number of chips participants allocated to the surcharge under 15% customary 
tipping (M = 2.42) is lower than that under the 15% mandatory service gratuity (M = 
3.59; F (1, 311) = 26.20, p < .001, 2p  = .078). Neither the main effects for the total 
expense awareness (F (1, 311) = .019, p = .891, 2p  < .001) nor its interaction with 
surcharge policy (F (1, 311) = .021, p = .884, 2p  < .001) was significant. 
Because participants allocated fewer chips to the surcharge than the equal 
weight (i.e., 5 out of 10) across surcharge policy conditions (M = 2.42 vs. 5, t (157) = -
19.294, p < .001 for 15% customary tipping; M = 3.59 vs. 5, t (156) = -7.707, p < .001 
for a 15% mandatory service gratuity), I concluded that participants considered the 
surcharge less important than the brunch price in their price evaluation, regardless of 
whether the surcharge is voluntary or mandatory. However, the significant main effect 
of surcharge policy indicated that the15% mandatory service gratuity was rated as 
more important in price evaluation than the corresponding 15% voluntary tipping. 
Consequently, participants should be less likely to ignore the former than the latter. 
Thus, I found indirect support for H1.  
Choice of Evaluation Base. To further examine the differential processing 
effect of voluntary versus mandatory service gratuity, I asked participants to indicate 
which of the three mutually exclusive and exhaustive price component(s) (i.e., the 
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brunch price only, any applicable tips/surcharges only, or the total expense) they 
focused on when assessing the perceived expensiveness of the Sunday brunch at 
restaurant B. I first recoded participants’ choice of evaluation base into a binary 
variable representing their use (or lack thereof) of the surcharge information. Thus, 
participants who focused on brunch price only and hence ignored the surcharge when 
they assessed the perceived expensiveness were assigned 0 whereas those who 
considered surcharge information in their price evaluation were assigned 1. I then 
regressed the use of surcharge on surcharge policy dummy, awareness of the total 
expense dummy and the interaction between them. Heteroscedasticity-consistent 
regression results indicated that the interaction between surcharge policy and 
awareness of the total expense dummies was not significant (B=0.158, t (311) = 1.573, 
p = .117). I hence only ran tests on two-way contingency tables in subsequent analyses.  
A 2 (surcharge policy) x 2 (use of surcharge information) chi-square analysis 
revealed a significant association between surcharge policy and participants’ use of 
surcharge ( 2 (1) = 9.194, p < .01). The Z test of equality for column proportions 
(please see table 2.3) pointed out that the proportion of participants who ignored the 
surcharge and used the base price only in price evaluation was significantly higher 
under 15% customary tipping (37.97%) than under the 15% mandatory gratuity 
(22.29%; p < .05). Therefore, the data confirmed my hypothesis (H1) that consumers 
tended to disregard voluntary tips more often than the corresponding mandatory 
service gratuities in their price evaluation.  
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Table 2.3 A two-way surcharge policy x use of surcharge contingency table  
 
 Surcharge Policy 
15% Customary Tipping              15% Mandatory Service 
Gratuity 
Count Column N % Count Column N % 
Use of 
Surcharge in 
Price Evaluation 
Ignore 60 37.97% a 35 22.29% b 
Consider 98 62.03% a 122 77.71% b 
 
Note: Proportions in the same row not sharing the same subscript are significantly different at p < 0.05 in 
the two-sided test of equality for column proportions. Tests assume equal variances. 
 
 
I also conducted a chi-square analysis on a 2 (the total expense awareness) x 2 
(use of surcharge information) contingency table and found a significant association 
between total expense awareness and participants’ use of surcharge ( 2 (1) = 11.898, p 
< .01). The Z test of equality for column proportions (please see table 2.4) indicated 
that the proportion of participants who ignored the surcharge and used the base price 
only in price evaluation was significantly higher when they were not asked to estimate 
the total expense before price evaluation (38.99%) than when they were asked to do so 
(21.15%; p < .05). These data provided some evidence that the manipulation to guide 
customers’ attention to surcharge information by asking them to determine the total 
expense before price evaluation was successful.  
 
Perceived Surcharge Policy Fairness  
 A 2 (surcharge policy) x 2 (the total expense awareness) ANOVA on perceived 
surcharge policy fairness (Cronbach’s α = 0.90) revealed a significant main effect of 
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Table 2.4 A two-way the total expense awareness x use of surcharge contingency table  
 
 
 The total Expense Awareness 
Not Asked              Asked 
Count Column N % Count Column N % 
Use of 
Surcharge in 
Price Evaluation 
Ignore 62 38.99% a 33 21.15% b 
Consider 97 61.01% a 123 78.85% b 
 
Note: Proportions in the same row not sharing the same subscript are significantly different at p < 0.05 in 
the two-sided test of equality for column proportions. Tests assume equal variances. 
 
 
surcharge policy (F (1, 311) = 64.438, p < .001, 2p  = .172) qualified by a significant 
interaction between surcharge policy and the total expense awareness (F (1, 311) = 
5.322, p = .022, 2p  = .017). Simple effect comparisons indicated that when 
participants were not asked to estimate their total expense before assessing the 
expensiveness of the Sunday brunch, those exposed to 15% customary tipping (M = 
4.89) rated the surcharge policy as more fair than those exposed to a 15% mandatory 
service gratuity (M = 4.03; F (311) = 29.479, p < .01, 2p  = .05). When participants 
were asked to estimate their total expense before assessing the expensiveness of the 
Sunday brunch, the difference in fairness perception between those exposed to 15% 
customary tipping (M = 5.43) and those exposed to a 15% mandatory service gratuity 
(M = 3.88; F (311) = 94.386, p < .01, 
2
p  = .145) became even more pronounced 
(please see figure 3.4). Overall, the findings support H2.   
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Figure 2.4 Mean Ratings of Perceived Surcharge Policy Fairness 
 
Mediation Analysis 
Perceived Expensiveness. Advocated by some researchers (Zhao, Lynch, & 
Chen, 2010) as a modern and superior way than the traditional Baron-Kenny “three 
tests + Sobel” steps (Baron & Kenny, 1986) to conduct mediation analysis, 
nonparametric bootstrap tests of the indirect effects (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; 
Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007; Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, & Petty, 2011) were 
used to evaluate my proposed parallel meditation model for perceived menu price 
expensiveness (please see figure 2.5). In these analyses, mediation is significant if the 
95% bias corrected and accelerated confidence intervals for the indirect effect do not 
include 0 (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Preacher et al., 2007). Because the model contains 
a binary mediator (i.e., Use of Surcharge), which cannot be properly handled by 
Preacher and Hayes’s various SAS/SPSS macros for bootstrap test of mediation, I 
used Mplus instead to conduct the mediation analyses.  
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First, consistent with my previous findings using process measures, I found 
that, relative to participants in the 15% customary tipping condition, those exposed to 
a 15% mandatory service gratuity used the surcharge more often in their price 
evaluation (B = .424, se = .067, p = .0027) and perceived the surcharge as less fair (B 
= -1.161, se = .0147, p < .001). These data lend additional support for H1 and H2. The 
other two significant path coefficients in the model further indicated that participants’ 
use of surcharge information in their price evaluation increased their perceived 
expensiveness (B = .426, se = .068, p < .001) whereas their surcharge fairness 
perception negatively affected their price perception (B = -.143, se = .041, p < .001). 
Hence, H3 and H4 were both supported.  
 
Note: Path coefficients with an asterisk (*) are significant (p ≤ 0.05). Bolded paths with 3.25 pt weight 
represent significant indirect effects (p ≤ 0.01).  
 
Figure 2.5 Test results of the parallel mediation model of perceived expensiveness 
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More important, results based on 5000 bootstrapped samples using bias-
corrected and accelerated 95% confidence intervals showed that controlling for the 
effect of perceived expensiveness of restaurant A (B = .679, se = .057, p <.001), 
surcharge policy had a non-significant residual direct effect (DE = -.066, se = .114, p 
= .566) on perceived expensiveness of restaurant B. However, the indirect effects via 
participants’ use of surcharge in price evaluation (IE = .181, se = .07, LL = .043, UL 
= .318) and their fairness perceptions on surcharge policy (IE = .166, se = .051, LL 
= .065, UL = .267) were both significant. Therefore, the two proposed mediators 
together fully mediated the relationship between surcharge policy and perceived 
expensiveness of restaurant B (TE = .281, se = .100, LL = .084, UL = .478).  
To provide further evidence supporting my proposed parallel mediation model, 
I also compared the strengths of the two mediation effects (Lau & Cheung, 2010). 
Results obtained by Mplus indicated the difference in strengths between the two 
mediators was not significantly different from 0 (DM = M1-M2 = -0.015, se = .085, 
LL = -0.181, UL = .152). Thus, I found strong support for H5.   
 Patronage Intent. The proposed mediation model of patronage intent was again 
tested using the bootstrap method with Mplus (please see figure 2.6). Hypotheses H1 
to H4 were all supported by significant coefficients on the relevant paths (all ps < .02). 
As stated in H6, participants’ fairness perceptions on surcharge policy positively 
influenced their patronage intent (B = .357, se = .056, p < .001). Contrary to H7, the 
path coefficient from perceived expensiveness to patronage intent was not significant, 
but in the expected direction (B = -.159, se = .119, p = .181). Consequently, results 
based on 5000 bootstrapped samples using bias-corrected and accelerated 95% 
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confidence intervals showed that the only significant indirect effect in this model is 
that via perceived surcharge policy fairness (IE = -0.398, se = .076, LL = -0.547, UL = 
-0.250). None of the indirect effects via perceived expensiveness on patronage intent 
of restaurant B was significant (All ps > .24). Hence, H8 is only partially supported. 
Finally, though not hypothesized, the data also revealed a marginally significant 
indirect effect via the use of surcharge on patronage intent (IE = -0.119, se = .063, p 
= .059). However, the strength of the mediating effect of perceived surcharge fairness 
is significantly larger than that of use of surcharge (DM = M1-M2 = -0.279, se = .091, 
LL = -0.457, UL = -.101). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Path coefficients with an asterisk (*) are significant (p ≤ 0.05). Bolded paths with 3.25 pt weight 
represent a significant indirect effect (p ≤ 0.01) and those with 2.25 pt weight represent a marginally 
significant indirect effect (p ≤ 0.10). 
 
Figure 2.6 Test results of the mediation model of patronage intent 
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Discussion  
In Study 2, I replicated the findings from Study 1 such that participants tended 
to perceive menu prices with 15% customary tipping as less expensive than those with 
a mandatory 15% service gratuity. More important, I explicitly examined the 
underlying mechanisms of these effects by including several process measures and 
testing my proposed parallel mediation model of perceived menu price expensiveness. 
I found strong support for all relevant hypotheses (H1-H5) and my mediation model 
indicated that two distinct psychological mechanisms operated concomitantly and in 
similar strengths to bring about the differential effects of surcharge policies on price 
perception. First, in the information processing route, participants in the 15% 
customary tipping condition are more likely to ignore the surcharge information and 
use the brunch price only than their counterparts in the 15% mandatory service 
gratuity condition when evaluating the perceived expensiveness of the Sunday brunch. 
Consequently, the negligence of additional charge for the Sunday brunch by those 
participants leads to lower perceived total cost and lower expensiveness ratings. 
Second, in the information evaluation route, participants in the 15% customary tipping 
condition tend to perceived the surcharge as more fair than those in the 15% 
mandatory service gratuity condition. The favorable surcharge fairness perception of 
those participants then translates into lower perceived expensiveness of the Sunday 
brunch.  
Given that I did not find support for the moderating role of participants’ 
awareness of the total expense for the relationship between surcharge policy and 
perceived expensiveness, I looked into the process measures for some insights. First, 
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while I found evidence that the manipulation was successful in prompting more 
participants across surcharge conditions to attend to and use surcharge information in 
their price evaluation, a follow-up analysis indicated that the majority of the increase 
(18 out of 26) in the number of participants who factored surcharges into their price 
perception when asked about the total expense came from the 15% mandatory service 
gratuity condition. As a result, the total expense recall manipulation actually increased 
rather than decreased the processing biases due to surcharge policy. Second, 
participants’ fairness ratings on the surcharge indicated that the difference in fairness 
perceptions between surcharge policies was intensified when participants were asked 
to determine the total expense before price evaluation (please see figure 2.4). It is 
possible that the manipulation to channel participants’ attention to the surcharge 
information made them more acute to the fairness of each surcharge policy. Thus, 
asking participants to estimate the total expenses not only increased processing bias 
between voluntary and mandatory service gratuities but also reinforced evaluation bias 
in fairness perceptions of the two surcharge policies. However, although the 
manipulation worked in the opposite direction as I expected, it seemed that it was not 
strong enough to produce a significant interaction between participants’ awareness of 
the total expense and surcharge policy.  
As for the model of patronage intent, I found significant support for the 
mediating effect via perceived surcharge policy fairness only. In addition, the data 
showed that the indirect effect via use of surcharge on patronage intent was marginally 
significant. Contrary to my hypotheses, participants’ perceived expensiveness on the 
Sunday brunch did not influence their patronage intent of the restaurant. This non-
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significant result may be a Type 2 error due to a lack of statistical power. Accordingly, 
I did not find any significant indirect effects via perceived expensiveness on demand.  
 
Study 3 
Recall that in my parallel mediation model, the disparities in perceived menu 
price expensiveness between participants exposed to voluntary tipping and those 
exposed to equivalent mandatory service gratuity are assumed to be caused by both 
differential processing effect and differential evaluation effect. Consequently, if a 
variable helps reduce or eliminate either effect, then it can potentially moderate the 
relationship between surcharge policy and perceptions of menu price expensiveness. 
In Study 2, I investigated total expense awareness, a potential moderator on the 
information processing route of my parallel mediation model. In the current study, I 
set out to examine local tipping norm, a potential moderator on the information 
evaluation route of my parallel mediation model.  
In my earlier discussion on surcharge fairness, I argued that industry norm has 
a significant impact on perceived price fairness. When the surcharge policy employed 
by a restaurant is in contradiction with the industry norm, as in the case of a US 
restaurant charging a mandatory service gratuity in lieu of voluntary tipping, 
consumers will perceive the former policy as less fair than the latter policy. The 
differential surcharge fairness perceptions, in turn, may contribute to the differences in 
price perception. On the other hand, consumers’ fairness perception on the 15% 
mandatory service gratuity relative to that of voluntary tipping should be improved if 
it is actually consistent with the industry norm. If this is the case, the differences in 
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perceived expensiveness between the two surcharge polices should become smaller. 
Study 3 was therefore designed to examine the possible moderating effect of local 
tipping norm on consumers’ perceived menu price expensiveness. Specifically, I 
hypothesized that:  
H10: The local tipping norm moderates the relationship between surcharge 
policy and perceived price expensiveness.  
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Three hundred and twenty-five participants responded to a job listing (a.k.a. 
HIT) on MTurk website to take a short online survey about the effectiveness of 
restaurant advertising flyers. Twenty-one participants did not complete the survey and 
were excluded from the analyses. Out of the 304 participants included in the analyses, 
60% were men and 77% were Caucasian. Their ages ranged from 18 to 79, with the 
average being 29.2. Slightly less than half of the participants (i.e., 44%) were college 
graduates. Twenty-seven percent of the participants reported a household income less 
than $25,000 a year, 32% reported between $25,001 and $50,000, 30% reported 
between $50,001 and $100,000, and 12% reported more than $100,000 a year. Their 
average dining out frequency at full-service restaurants was three times per month, 
with a low response of zero time per month and a high response of 20 times per month. 
Thus, this profile of participants is consistent with that of the two previous studies. 
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Design and Procedure 
Participants in Study 3 were first presented with a scenario in which they were 
on a week-long vacation, visiting a large capital city in Africa. Participants read that 
they have dined out at several downtown restaurants and learned that the exchange 
rate of US dollar for local currency is approximately 1:1. In addition, half of the 
participants were told that, in this foreign country, it is customary for restaurant 
patrons to leave 15% as tips whereas the other half of participants were told that it is 
customary for local restaurants to add a 15% mandatory service gratuity. Right after 
reading the scenario, participants were asked to answer three open-ended questions 
based on what they have learned from it. I used these questions to ensure that 
participants read through and understand the scenario correctly. Responses to these 
questions were not included in the analyses. 
Next, participants started the flyer evaluation task for restaurant A and went on 
for restaurant B as in the previous studies. The stimuli for Study 3 are similar to those 
of Study 2 with several notable exceptions. First, for restaurant A, I used a service-
inclusive price of $10.85 per person (no tipping or service charges) for the Sunday 
brunch. Second, I measured participants’ fairness perception on surcharge policy 
employed by restaurant B after explicitly telling participants restaurant B’s surcharge 
policy.
9
 Finally, I operationalized consumer demand as the choice intentions between 
going restaurant A and going restaurant B for the Sunday brunch by placing the two 
flyers side by side after participants finished evaluating individual flyers.  
 
                                                 
9
 Consequently, for analyses related to participants’ surcharge fairness perceptions, I only included 
those who successfully passed the manipulation check for restaurant surcharge policy.  
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Results 
 
Manipulation Check 
 I conducted two manipulation checks to ensure that participants attended to 
both the surcharge policy used by restaurant B specifically as well as the tipping norm 
in the country described in the scenario. About 90% (274 out of 304) participants 
chose the correct surcharge policy for restaurant B, 79% (239 out of 304) participants 
identified the correct tipping norm for the country as whole, and 71% (217 out of 304) 
participants passed both manipulation checks. Although less than desired, I conclude 
that the manipulations were successful in producing the intended differences in 
perceived surcharge policies and local tipping norms.  
 
The Influence of Individual Tipping Propensity on Perceived Expensiveness 
 To check for the potential influence of individual tipping propensity on 
perceived expensiveness, I conducted similar analyses as in previous studies. First, I 
examined the relationship between participants’ typical tip size and their perceived 
expensiveness of restaurant B and found a significant negative correlation (r = -.177, n 
= 304, p = .002). Second, I regressed the expensiveness ratings of restaurant B on 
typical tip size, the 15% mandatory service gratuity policy dummy, the 15% 
mandatory service gratuity norm dummy as well as three covariates (i.e., the perceived 
expensiveness of restaurant A (Cronbach’s α = .99), the association ratings of 15% 
mandatory service gratuity and upscale restaurants, and the expected quality of 
restaurant B). The interaction terms between typical tip size, surcharge policy and 
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local tipping norm dummies were then added to the model. The main effects model 
produced significant effects for the 15% mandatory service gratuity policy (B = .278, 
t(297) = 2.977, p = .003) as well as three covariates (all ps < 0.03). However, the 
coefficients for typical tip size (B = -.075, t(297) = -1.585, p = .114) and the 15% 
mandatory service gratuity norm  (B = .064, t(297) = .681, p = .497) were not 
significant. Consequently, although I found a significant negative correlation between 
typical tip size and perceived expensiveness, results from the main effects model 
indicated that the influence of tipping propensity on price perception became 
inconsequential when perceived expensiveness of restaurant A, the association rating 
of 15% mandatory service gratuity and upscale restaurants as well as the expected 
quality of restaurant B were included as covariates. Moreover, all interaction terms 
from the full model, including the one between typical tip size and the 15% mandatory 
service gratuity policy dummy, did not reach statistical significance (all ps > .24). 
Therefore, I excluded individual tipping propensity in subsequent analyses.  
 
The Moderating Role of Local Tipping Norm 
 The data were analyzed using a 2 (surcharge policy for restaurant B: 15% 
customary tipping vs. 15% mandatory service gratuity) x 2 (local tipping norms: 15% 
customary tipping vs. 15% mandatory service gratuity) ANCOVA with perceived 
expensiveness of restaurant A, the expected quality of restaurant B as well as the three 
surcharge policy-upscale restaurant association ratings as covariates. The initial 
analysis indicated that some of the covariates are not significant (please see table 2.5). 
I removed non-significant covariates sequentially, and the final ANCOVA model 
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included participants’ perceived expensiveness ratings on restaurant A (F (1, 297) = 
233.075, p < .001, 2p  = .44), the association ratings of 15% mandatory service 
gratuity and upscale restaurants (F (1, 297) = 14.543, p < .001, 2p  = .047), and the 
expected quality of restaurant B (F (1, 297) = 5.013, p = .026, 2p  = .017) as 
significant covariates. 
  
Table 2.5 Two-way ANCOVA of perceived expensiveness (initial model)  
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:PercExpensiveness 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 194.818a 8 24.352 36.738 .000 .499 
Intercept 4.404 1 4.404 6.643 .010 .022 
PercExpensivenessA 151.465 1 151.465 228.504 .000 .436 
VTupscale .512 1 .512 .772 .380 .003 
AGupscale 4.733 1 4.733 7.140 .008 .024 
GIupscale 1.113 1 1.113 1.679 .196 .006 
QualityExp 3.616 1 3.616 5.455 .020 .018 
Norm .318 1 .318 .480 .489 .002 
SurPolicy 5.571 1 5.571 8.405 .004 .028 
Norm * SurPolicy .693 1 .693 1.046 .307 .004 
Error 195.543 295 .663    
Total 2831.750 304     
Corrected Total 390.361 303     
a. R Squared = .499 (Adjusted R Squared = .485) 
 
In this model, I found only a significant main effect for restaurant surcharge 
policy such that participants perceived brunch price with 15% customary tipping (M = 
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2.70) as less expensive than the same price with 15% mandatory service gratuities (M 
= 2.98, F (1, 297) = 9.042, p = .003, 2p  = .03). Neither the main effect of local 
tipping norm (F (1, 297) = .464, p = .496, 2p  = .002) nor its interaction with 
restaurant surcharge policy (F (1, 297) = .907, p = .342, 2p  = .003) was significant.  
Therefore, contrary to H10, different surcharge policies used by the restaurant seemed 
to influence participants’ perceived menu price expensiveness in a similar way, 
regardless of whether it is consistent with the local tipping norm. I hence collapsed the 
data across the local tipping norm conditions in the mediation analyses. 
 
Use of Surcharge in Price Evaluation  
Evaluation Weight. A 2 (surcharge policy for restaurant B) x 2 (local tipping 
norms) ANOVA on the number of chips participants assigned to the surcharge 
revealed a significant main effect of surcharge policy (F (1, 300) = 17.592, p < .001, 
2
p  = .055) qualified by a significant interaction between surcharge policy and local 
tipping norm (F (1, 300) = 5.312, p = .022, 2p  = .017). Simple effect comparisons 
indicated that when the local tipping norm is 15% customary tipping, the difference in 
the number of chips participants allocated to the surcharge under 15% customary 
tipping (M = 2.92) and that under the 15% mandatory service gratuity was not 
significant but in the expected direction (M = 3.37; F (1, 300) = 1.773, p = .184, 2p  
= .006). In contrast, when the local tipping norm is 15% mandatory service gratuities, 
the difference in the number of chips allocated to the surcharge between those exposed 
to 15% customary tipping (M = 2.50) and those exposed to a 15% mandatory service 
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gratuity (M = 4.04; F (300) = 21.263, p < .001, 2p  = .066) became significant at the 
conventional .05 two-tailed p-value (see Figure 3.7). Overall, the data suggested that 
the15% mandatory service gratuity was considered as more important in price 
evaluation than the corresponding 15% voluntary tipping, regardless of the local 
tipping norms.  
Choice of Evaluation Base. As in Study 2, I first recoded participants’ choice 
of evaluation base into a binary variable representing their use or lack of use of the 
surcharge information. I then regressed the use of surcharge on surcharge policy, local 
tipping norm and the interaction between them. Heteroscedasticity-consistent 
regression results indicated that the interaction between surcharge policy and local 
tipping norm was not significant (B = .115, t (300) = 1.046, p = .297). Therefore, I 
only ran tests on two-way contingency tables in subsequent analyses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Mean Number of Chips Allocated to Surcharge 
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A 2 (surcharge policy) x 2 (use of surcharge) chi-square analysis revealed a 
significant association between surcharge policy and participants’ use of surcharge 
( 2 (1) = 16.315, p < .01). The Z test of equality for column proportions (see table 2.5) 
revealed that the proportion of participants who ignored the surcharge and used the 
base price only in price evaluation was significantly higher under 15% customary 
tipping (50.65%) than under the 15% mandatory gratuity (28%; p < .05). Hence, the 
data confirmed my hypothesis (H1) that consumers tended to disregard voluntary tips 
more often than corresponding mandatory service gratuities in their price evaluation.  
I also conducted a chi-square analysis on a 2 (local tipping norm) x 2 (use of 
surcharge) contingency table and found a non-significant association between local 
tipping norm and participants’ use of surcharge ( 2 (1) = 2.252, p = .133). This 
suggested that out local tipping norm manipulation did not influence participants’ use 
of surcharge information. 
 
Table 2.5 A two-way surcharge policy x use of surcharge contingency table  
 
 Surcharge Policy 
15% Customary 
Tipping              
15% Mandatory Service 
Gratuity 
Count Column N % Count Column N % 
Use of 
Surcharge in 
Price Evaluation 
Ignore 78 50.65% a 42 28% b 
Consider 76 49.35% a 108 72% b 
 
Note: Proportions in the same row not sharing the same subscript are significantly different at p< 0.05 in 
the two-sided test of equality for column proportions. Tests assume equal variances. 
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Perceived Surcharge Policy Fairness  
A 2 (surcharge policy for restaurant B) x 2 (local tipping norms) ANOVA on 
perceived surcharge policy fairness (Cronbach’s α = 0.96) for participants who passed 
the surcharge policy manipulation check revealed a significant main effect of 
surcharge policy only such that participants perceived the 15% surcharge at restaurant 
B as more fair under customary tipping (M = 6.08) than under mandatory service 
gratuities (M = 4.65, F (1, 270) = 80.247, p < .001, 2p  = .229). Neither the main 
effect for local tipping norm (F (1, 270) = .527, p = .468, 2p  = .002) nor its 
interaction with surcharge policy (F (1, 270) = 1.024, p = .313, 2p  = .004) reached 
statistical significance. These data provided support for H2. However, the non-
significant interaction term suggested that the local tipping norm manipulation to 
reduce differences in participants’ fairness perceptions on 15% customary tipping 
versus a 15% mandatory service gratuity was unsuccessful because participants had 
similar fairness perceptions on the two surcharge policies regardless of the local 
tipping norms. This finding may help explain the non-significant moderating effect of 
local tipping norms on the relationship between surcharge policy and price perception.  
 
Mediation Analysis 
Perceived Expensiveness. As in Study 2, I evaluated that parallel mediation 
model of price perception using nonparametric bootstrap tests of the indirect effects 
(please see figure 2.8). First, in line with my preceding analyses, the significant path 
coefficients indicated that participant in the 15% mandatory service gratuity condition 
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considered the surcharge more often (B = .563, se = .163, p < .001) but perceived the 
surcharge as less fair (B = -1.426, se = .0152, p < .001) in their price evaluation than 
those in the 15% customary tipping condition. In addition, I found that participants’ 
use of surcharge led to higher perceived expensiveness of restaurant B (B = .288, se 
= .067, p < .001). Hence, H1 to H3 are all supported. However, contrary to H4, 
participants’ surcharge fairness perception had no impact on their price perception (B 
= -.045, se = .04, p = .26) in the data.  
Results based on 5000 bootstrapped samples using bias-corrected and 
accelerated 95% confidence intervals showed that controlling for the effect of 
perceived expensiveness of restaurant A (B = .724, se = .051, p <.001), the association 
ratings of 15% mandatory service gratuity and upscale restaurants (B = -0.073, se 
= .031, p =.019), as well as the expected quality of restaurant B (B = .081, se = .051, p 
= .117), surcharge policy had a non-significant residual direct effect (DE = 0.097, se 
= .117, p = .409) on perceived expensiveness of restaurant B. The indirect effects via 
participants’ use of surcharge on perceived expensiveness (IE = .162, se = .063, LL 
= .039, UL = .285) was significant. However, participants’ fairness perceptions on 
surcharge policy no longer mediated their price perceptions (IE = .064, se = .058, LL 
= -0.05, UL = .178, p = 0.273). Consequently, participants’ use of surcharge fully 
mediated the relationship between surcharge policy and perceived expensiveness of 
restaurant B (TE = .323, se = .093, LL = .141, UL = .504).I only found partial support 
for the parallel mediation model of price perception with this data (H5).  
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Note: Path coefficients with an asterisk (*) are significant (p ≤ 0.05). Bolded paths with 3.25 pt weight 
represent a significant indirect effect (p ≤ 0.01). 
 
Figure 2.8 Test results of the parallel mediation model of perceived expensiveness 
   
  
 Patronage Intent. The bootstrap method was again used to test the proposed 
mediation model of patronage intent (please see figure 2.9). As in the mediation model 
of price perception, path coefficients corresponding to H1 to H3 were all significant 
(all ps < .001) but the one corresponding to H4 again turned out to be non-significant 
(B = -.047, se = .039, p = .237). Moreover, I found that participants’ fairness 
perceptions on surcharge policy positively influenced their patronage intent (B = .286, 
se = .077, p < .001) whereas their perceived expensiveness negatively influenced their 
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patronage intent (B = -.541, se = .188, p = .004). Hence, both H6 and H7 were 
supported. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Path coefficients with an asterisk (*) are significant (p ≤ 0.05). Bolded paths with 3.25 pt weight 
represent a significant indirect effect (p ≤ 0.01) and those with 2.25 pt weight represent a marginally 
significant indirect effect (p ≤ 0.10).  
 
Figure 2.9 Test results of the mediation model of patronage intent 
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perceived expensiveness on patronage intent achieved marginal significance (IE = -
0.087, se = .048, p = 0.068). Hence, I found some support for H8. However, the 
strength of the mediating effect of perceived surcharge fairness is significantly larger 
than that of perceived menu price expensiveness (DM = M1-M2 = -0.315, se = .131, 
LL = -0.572, UL = -.057). 
 
Discussion 
In Study 3, I again obtained strong evidence for the differential effects of 
surcharge policy on price perception such that participants are inclined to perceive a 
menu price with 15% customary tipping as less expensive than the same price with a 
15% mandatory service gratuity. In addition, I found support for hypotheses H1-H3 
with the process measures. However, inconsistent with H4, the data indicated that 
participants’ surcharge fairness perception did not influence their perceived menu 
price expensiveness. As a result, the indorect effect of perceived surcharge fairness 
turned out to be non-significant and participants’ use of surcharge information alone 
fully mediated the relationship between surcharge policy and perceived menu price 
expensiveness. Thus, my proposed parallel mediation model of price perception (H5) 
was only partially supported.  
Furthermore, contrary to H10, I found that the local tipping norms did not 
moderate the relationship between surcharge policy and the perceived menu price 
expensiveness, which may be caused by the failure of local tipping norm manipulation 
to reduce the differences in participants’ fairness perception between surcharge 
policies as I pointed out earlier. It is possible that the tipping norm of participants’ 
 85 
own culture is so deeply ingrained in their mind that it overrode any effect of the local 
tipping norm.  
However, although the 15% mandatory service gratuity tipping norm fell short 
on enhancing participants’ fairness perceptions on the corresponding surcharge policy 
used by the restaurant, it seemed to help assuage their “pain of paying” and made the 
disparities in expensiveness perceptions between surcharge policies negligible. 
Consequently, the local tipping norm manipulation may be responsible for the null 
effect of surcharge fairness perceptions on perceived menu price expensiveness (H4) 
and the partial breakdown of my proposed parallel mediation model of price 
perception in this study.  
As in Study 2, I once more found strong evidence of the positive impact of 
surcharge fairness perception on patronage intent (H6) as well as the mediating role of 
perceived surcharge fairness on the relationship between surcharge policy and 
patronage intent. In addition, the data showed that favorable price perception leaded to 
higher patronage intent (H7) and that the indirect effect of surcharge policy via the 
perceived expensiveness on patronage intent was marginally significant. Thus, I found 
some evidence for H9. However, the mediating strength of surcharge fairness 
perception is significantly stronger than that of perceived expensiveness.  
 
General Discussion  
 Although behavioral scientists have conducted an extensive body of research 
on price partitioning, the framing effect of surcharge has received little attention. 
Several researchers touched upon this topic and examined the impact of expressing the 
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surcharge either in dollar terms or as a percentage of the base price on price perception. 
Their findings suggested that percentage surcharge often gives rise to a lower total 
price perception than comparable dollar surcharge because consumers are more likely 
to disregard or discount the former than the latter (Kim, 2006; Morwitz et al., 1998; 
Xia & Monroe, 2004).  
 The current paper extended framing research on surcharge by studying whether 
presenting the same service gratuity either as a customary tip or as a mandatory fee 
induces different consumer reactions. In the context of Sunday brunch evaluation, I 
showed that participants perceived a menu price with 15% customary tipping as less 
expensive than the same price with a 15% mandatory service gratuity (Studies 1, 2 and 
3). In addition, they expressed greater intent to patronize a restaurant when it is under 
voluntary tipping than when it is under a corresponding mandatory service gratuity 
(Studies 2 and 3).  
 More importantly, in addition to demonstrating the differential effects of 
voluntary versus mandatory service gratuity on price perception and demand, I 
thoroughly explored various psychological mechanisms underlying these effects 
(Studies 2 and 3). Together, the studies provide converging evidence that participants’ 
use of surcharge information and perceived surcharge fairness acted in parallel and 
with similar strengths as mediators of the relationship between surcharge policy and 
menu price perception. I bolstered support for my proposed model by ruling out 
consumers’ association of mandatory service gratuity with upscale restaurants and 
individual tipping propensity as potential explanations. Furthermore, I found some 
evidence that participants’ patronage intent was mediated by both surcharge fairness 
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perception and price expensiveness perception, although the impact of the former 
mediator is significantly larger than the latter.  
 While extant literature has provided several different psychological accounts 
on how consumers respond to partitioned prices, to the best of my knowledge, the 
current research is the first empirical investigation that incorporates multiple 
mechanisms underlying the price partitioning effect simultaneously. The establishment 
of a dual-process model of partitioned price perception in the paper has two important 
theoretical implications. First, it suggests that some of the null or inverse effects of 
price partitioning in previous studies may be manifestations of multiple competing 
psychological processes. Thus, a good way to reconcile these conflicts is to identify 
the contending mechanisms in those studies. Second, it calls attention to the need to 
use a more integrative approach when predicting the downstream effects of price 
partitioning. As shown in this paper, price partitioning may foster multiple processes 
in tandem. Consequently, it may not be appropriate for researchers to single out only 
one of them and examine it in isolation.  
 
Managerial Implications 
 The findings of the present research also have important implications for the 
food service industry as a growing number of restaurants have adopted mandatory 
service gratuity in place of voluntary tipping for part or all of their services in recent 
years. Although the decision to switch to mandatory service gratuity is mostly driven 
by concerns about internal customers such as employee compensation, this research 
suggests that it may have a negative impact on external customers in terms of menu 
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price perception and patronage intent. Consequently, restaurants, especially those 
targeting price-sensitive clientele, should think twice before jumping on the mandatory 
gratuity bandwagon.  
 Additionally, results of my parallel mediation model of menu price perception 
indicate that there may be two different ways for restaurants imposing mandatory 
service gratuity to try to alleviate the adverse influence of the surcharge policy on 
perception of menu price expensiveness. First, restaurants may seek to minimize 
chances of customers factoring the mandatory service gratuity into menu price 
perception. The most common practice to achieve this goal is to make the surcharge 
less salient so that customers are likely to overlook it. However, a previous study by 
Lee & Han (2002) suggested that when consumers hold the restaurant responsible for 
their failure to attend to the surcharge, their brand attitude will decrease. Furthermore, 
anecdotal evidence indicates that some customers may be outraged once they realize 
that restaurants oblige them to tip at a certain level without giving proper notice or 
warning, which may be more damaging than perceptions of high menu prices. As a 
result, reducing customers’ tendency to consider the mandatory service gratuity in 
price evaluation by making it unobtrusive may do more harm than good.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 Another way to decrease consumers’ perceived expensiveness on menu prices 
with a mandatory service gratuity is through improving their surcharge fairness 
perception. In my previous discussion, I have argued that when restaurants enforce 
service gratuities at a predetermined level, consumers perceive the surcharges as less 
fair because they entirely lose control over how much to tip. It follows that if 
restaurants can share the discretionary power to set the level of mandatory service 
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gratuity with the customers, it may help restore customers’ sense of control and hence 
improve their surcharge fairness perceptions. For example, rather than leave customers 
out of the entire price-setting process, restaurants exposing mandatory service 
gratuities could list several suggested gratuity levels and let customers choose among 
them. Being able to have the final say on how much they pay for the restaurant service 
should augment customers’ perceived surcharge fairness, which in turn has a positive 
impact on their menu price perception.  
 However, the most valuable benefit that comes with an enhanced fairness 
perception on the surcharge seems to be increased demand. The model showed that 
consumers’ perceived surcharge fairness influences their patronage intent directly 
rather than through price perception. In addition, the impact of perceived menu price 
expensiveness on patronage intent is only marginal when controlling for the direct 
effect of perceived surcharge fairness. That is to say, the perception of high menu 
price induced by a mandatory service gratuity may have limited impact on patronage 
intent as long as consumers perceive the surcharge by itself as relatively fair. As a 
whole, this research suggests that if a restaurant wants to switch from voluntary 
tipping to mandatory service gratuity, then the key to minimize any adverse effect 
with this move is to promote a positive fairness perception on the surcharge among its 
customers.  
Study Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
The current paper has several limitations that could be addressed in future 
research. First, in order to control for individual differences in tipping propensity, I 
used an explicit 15% customary tipping policy in place of the standard and often 
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unstated voluntary tipping. This design potentially eliminated the differences in visual 
salience between voluntary and mandatory service gratuity so that the results may be 
more conservative. Second, I only examined the 15% level of mandatory service 
gratuity, which corresponds to the lower boundary of the typical tipping range. Future 
research may wish to investigate mandatory service gratuity at other commonly used 
levels. Another limitation related to the design of the stimuli is the use of an 
advertising flyer featuring a prix fixe menu price. It may be meaningful to replicate the 
studies with the more commonly encountered a la carte menus to increase the 
generalizability and relevance of the study findings.  
Future research endeavor may also aim to discover significant moderators of 
the link between surcharge policy and perceptions of menu price expensiveness. For 
example, the findings implied that the tipping norm of one’s own culture, rather than 
that of the local culture, may be a potential moderator for price perceptions among 
people exposed to different surcharge policies. Consequently, a cross-cultural study 
involving people with different mindsets about service gratuity (e.g., voluntary tipping 
for Americans and mandatory service gratuity for Australians) should extend the 
current research. In addition, contextual factors such as the brand image or firm’s 
reputation and individual difference variables such as need for cognition may also be 
worthy of examination.  
 Finally, since I studied the differential effects of voluntary versus mandatory 
service gratuity on price perception and demand in the context of Sunday brunch flyer 
evaluation, the findings stand for an a priori assessment rather than a post hoc 
evaluation of a consumption experience. In this regard, a fruitful research avenue 
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would be conducting a simulation study or a field study that captures consumers’ full 
dining experience and examine the impact of surcharge policy on post-consumption 
satisfaction and repurchase intentions.   
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APPENDIX A: STUDY 1 
 
OVERVIEW 
You are invited to participate in a research study about the effectiveness of restaurant 
advertising flyers. You must be 18 years old to participate.    
 
There are no known discomforts or risks associated with participation in this study. 
Your participation is voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any time. Your 
responses to the questions will be anonymous. The study will take less than 10 
minutes to complete.    
  
INSTRUCTIONS 
Suppose that you want to have a brunch in the coming Sunday. There are two local 
restaurants famous for their Sunday Brunches. You have not been to either restaurant 
before but have heard that the quality of food and service of both restaurants is pretty 
good.   In the following screens, you will see Sunday Brunch flyers for each 
restaurant with food and price information sequentially. After reading each flyer, you 
will be asked to answer several questions about this restaurant. There is also a general 
background survey in the end of the questionnaire.    
 
Thank you for participating in this study.     
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             Restaurant A   
 
 
The Sunday Brunch at restaurant A is: 
(1 = Extremely inexpensive, 7 = Extremely expensive) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
The price of the Sunday Brunch at restaurant A is: 
(1 = Extremely unattractive, 7 = Extremely attractive) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
The Sunday Brunch at restaurant A is: 
(1 = Extremely low-priced, 7 = Extremely high-priced) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How likely would you go to restaurant A for Sunday Brunch? 
(1 = Very unlikely, 7 = Very likely) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I expect that the quality of food and service for the Sunday Brunch at restaurant A is: 
(1 = Very poor, 7 = Very high) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I think the flyer for Sunday Brunch at restaurant A is: 
(1 = Very unattractive, 7 = Very attractive) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please briefly list all the factors you considered when evaluating the expensiveness of 
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the Sunday Brunch at restaurant A: 
                         
  Restaurant B (voluntary gratuity) 
 
 
The Sunday Brunch at restaurant B is: 
(1 = Extremely inexpensive, 7 = Extremely expensive) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
The price of the Sunday Brunch at restaurant B is: 
(1 = Extremely unattractive, 7 = Extremely attractive) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
The Sunday Brunch at restaurant B is: 
(1 = Extremely low-priced, 7 = Extremely high-priced) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How likely would you go to restaurant B for Sunday Brunch? 
(1 = Very unlikely, 7 = Very likely) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I expect that the quality of food and service for the Sunday Brunch at restaurant B is: 
(1 = Very poor, 7 = Very high) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I think the flyer for Sunday Brunch at restaurant B is: 
(1 = Very unattractive, 7 = Very attractive) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Please briefly list all the factors you considered when evaluating the expensiveness of 
the Sunday Brunch at restaurant B: 
 
Which of the following pricing policies do you believe is used at restaurant B? 
 Voluntary tips 
 15% automatic gratuity 
 Gratuity-inclusive price (no tipping allowed) 
How much would you tip in dollars and cents for the $8.95 Sunday Brunch at 
restaurant B? 
 
Please answer the following questions based on your personal experience:    
-In general, what percent would you tip for satisfactory food and service at full-service 
restaurant? 
 
-If you dine out at a full-service restaurant where tipping is not allowed but instead 
built into the menu price, what percent would you expect to represent the hidden 
gratuities? 
 
How would you evaluate the fairness of the following pricing policies at full-service 
restaurants? 
(1 = Extremely unfair, 7 = Extremely fair) 
-Voluntary tipping:   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
-Automatic 15% service gratuity on all checks: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
-No tipping allowed (building service surcharge into the menu prices):   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How acceptable are the following pricing policies to you when you dine out at a full-
service restaurant? 
(1 = Extremely unacceptable, 7 = Extremely acceptable) 
-Voluntary tipping:   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
-Automatic 15% service gratuity on all checks: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
-No tipping allowed (building service surcharge into the menu prices):   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements:  
(1 = Very much disagree, 7 = Very much agree) 
-The practice of voluntary tipping is more common among upscale restaurants than 
among less expensive ones. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
- The practice of adding automatic gratuities to bills is more common among upscale 
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restaurants than among less expensive ones. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
- The practice of including the cost of service in menu prices is more common among 
upscale restaurants than among less expensive ones. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please evaluate the following statements: 
(1 = Very much disagree, 7 = Very much agree) 
-In general, a restaurant tip should be earned, not automatic. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
- I do not like being forced to pay tips at restaurants. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
- Restaurant customers should decide whether to tip and how much to tip. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please tell us about yourself.   
 
How old are you?   
 
What is your gender? 
 Male 
 Female 
What is your race? 
 White/Caucasian 
 African American 
 Hispanic 
 Asian 
 Mixed/Others 
Are you a US citizen or permanent residents? 
 Yes 
 No 
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What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 Less than High School 
 High School Graduate 
 Some College 
 College Graduate 
 Post-graduate 
What is your combined annual household income? 
 Less than 25,000 
 25,001 – 50,000 
 50,001 – 100,000 
 100,001 or more 
Please indicate your familiarity with US restaurant tipping customs: 
(1 = Very unfamiliar, 7 = Very familiar) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
On average, how many times per month do you dine out at full-service restaurants? 
                            
    Restaurant B (built-in gratuity)            Restaurant B (mandatory gratuity) 
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APPENDIX B: STUDY 2 
 
OVERVIEW 
You are invited to participate in a research study about the effectiveness of restaurant 
advertising flyers. You must be 18 years old to participate. There are no known 
discomforts or risks associated with participation in this study. Your participation is 
voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any time. Your responses to the questions 
will be anonymous. The study will take less than 10 minutes to complete.       
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Imagine that you want to have a brunch in the coming Sunday. There are two local 
restaurants famous for their Sunday Brunches. You have not been to either restaurant 
before but have heard that the quality of food and service of both restaurants is pretty 
good. In the following screens, you will see Sunday Brunch flyers for each restaurant 
with food and price information sequentially. After reading each flyer, you will be 
asked to answer several questions about this restaurant. There is also a general 
background survey in the end of the questionnaire.    
 
Thank you for participating in this study.    
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             Restaurant A 
 
 
The Sunday Brunch at restaurant A is: 
(1 = Extremely inexpensive, 7 = Extremely expensive) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
The Sunday Brunch at restaurant A is: 
(1 = Extremely low-priced, 7 = Extremely high-priced) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How likely would you go to restaurant A for Sunday Brunch? 
(1 = Very unlikely, 7 = Very likely) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I expect that the quality of food and service for the Sunday Brunch at restaurant A is: 
(1 = Very poor, 7 = Very high) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I think the flyer for Sunday Brunch at restaurant A is: 
(1 = Very unattractive, 7 = Very attractive) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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     Restaurant B (voluntary gratuity) 
           
 
[If you went to restaurant B’s Sunday Brunch by yourself, how much would you end 
up spending in total (including any applicable tips or gratuities)?]  
 
The Sunday Brunch at restaurant B is: 
(1 = Extremely inexpensive, 7 = Extremely expensive) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
The Sunday Brunch at restaurant B is: 
(1 = Extremely low-priced, 7 = Extremely high-priced) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How likely would you go to restaurant B for Sunday Brunch? 
(1 = Very unlikely, 7 = Very likely) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please choose one of the following three statements:        
When evaluating the expensiveness of the Sunday Brunch at restaurant B (the first two 
questions on this page):     
 I focused on the $8.95 brunch price ONLY. 
 I focused on any applicable tips/surcharges ONLY. 
 I focused on the total expense (i.e., the $8.95 brunch price PLUS any applicable 
tips/surcharges). 
 
Weight the importance of each individual price component in your expensiveness 
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evaluation of restaurant B (the first two questions on this page) by allocating 10 chips 
between them:  
______ 1) The $8.95 brunch price 
______ 2) The amount of tip I will voluntarily leave 
 
I expect that the quality of food and service for the Sunday Brunch at restaurant B is: 
(1 = Very poor, 7 = Very high) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I think the flyer for Sunday Brunch at restaurant B is: 
(1 = Very unattractive, 7 = Very attractive) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Which of the following statements best describes the pricing policy used at restaurant 
B for the Sunday Brunch? 
 Tipping is voluntary. Restaurant patrons can leave any amount they deem appropriate. 
They usually leave a 15% tip. 
 Restaurant patrons are required to pay 15% service gratuities on top of the $8.95 brunch 
price. 
 
Please use the scales below to express your reactions to the pricing policy at restaurant 
B for the Sunday Brunch.       
-The pricing policy used at restaurant B for the Sunday Brunch is: 
(1 = Very unfair, 7 = Very fair) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
-The pricing policy used at restaurant B for the Sunday Brunch is: 
(1 = Very unreasonable, 7 = Very reasonable) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
-The pricing policy used at restaurant B for the Sunday Brunch is: 
(1 = Very unjustified, 7 = Very justified) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please answer the following questions based on your personal experience:    
 
If you dine out at a full-service restaurant where tipping is voluntary, what percent 
would you tip for satisfactory food and service at full-service restaurant? 
 
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements:  
(1 = Very much disagree, 7 = Very much agree) 
-The practice of voluntary tipping is more common among upscale restaurants than 
among less expensive ones. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
-The practice of adding automatic gratuities to bills is more common among upscale 
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restaurants than among less expensive ones. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
-The practice of including the cost of service in menu prices is more common among 
upscale restaurants than among less expensive ones. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please evaluate the following statements: 
(1 = Very much disagree, 7 = Very much agree) 
-In general, a restaurant tip should be earned, not automatic. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
-I do not like being forced to pay tips at restaurants. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
-Restaurant customers should decide whether to tip and how much to tip. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please tell us about yourself.   
 
How old are you?  
 
What is your gender? 
 Male 
 Female 
What is your race? 
 White/Caucasian 
 African American 
 Hispanic 
 Asian 
 Mixed/Others 
Are you a US citizen or permanent residents? 
 Yes 
 No 
What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 Less than High School 
 High School Graduate 
 Some College 
 College Graduate 
 Post-graduate 
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What is your combined annual household income? 
 Less than 25,000 
 25,001 – 50,000 
 50,001 – 100,000 
 100,001 or more 
Please indicate your familiarity with US restaurant tipping customs: 
(1 = Very unfamiliar, 7 = Very familiar) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
On average, how many times per month do you dine out at full-service restaurants? 
            
    Restaurant B (mandatory gratuity) 
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APPENDIX C: STUDY 3 
  
 
OVERVIEW 
 
You are invited to participate in a research study about the effectiveness of restaurant 
advertising flyers. You must be 18 years old to participate.  
There are no known discomforts or risks associated with participation in this study. 
Your participation is voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any time. Your 
responses to the questions will be anonymous. The study will take less than 10 
minutes to complete.        
Thank you for participating in this study.     
 
SCENARIO (Very important to read!) 
 
Imagine that you are on a week-long vacation, visiting a large capital city in Africa. 
You have dined out at several downtown restaurants and enjoyed the food. You have 
learned that the exchange rate of US dollar for local currency is approximately 1:1 and 
it is customary for restaurant patrons to leave 15% as tips. [it is customary for local 
restaurants to add a 15% mandatory service gratuity.]                 
 
You want to have a brunch in the coming Sunday. There are two local restaurants 
famous for their Sunday Brunches. You have not been to either restaurant before but 
have heard that the quality of food and service of both restaurants is pretty good.   In 
the following screens, you will see Sunday Brunch flyers for each restaurant with food 
and price information sequentially. After reading each flyer, you will be asked to 
 109 
answer several questions about this restaurant. There is also a general background 
survey in the end of the questionnaire.      
 
First, please answer the following questions based on what you have learned in the 
scenario.  
 
-What continent are you visiting in the scenario? 
 
-What is the exchange rate of US dollar for local currency in the scenario? 
 
-What is the custom regarding tips/service charges in the country described in the 
scenario? 
                        
            Restaurant A 
 
 
The Sunday Brunch at restaurant A is: 
(1 = Extremely inexpensive, 7 = Extremely expensive) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
The Sunday Brunch at restaurant A is: 
(1 = Extremely low-priced, 7 = Extremely high-priced) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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I expect that the quality of food and service for the Sunday Brunch at restaurant A is: 
(1 = Very poor, 7 = Very high) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I think the flyer for Sunday Brunch at restaurant A is: 
(1 = Very unattractive, 7 = Very attractive) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
     Restaurant B (voluntary gratuity) 
 
 
The Sunday Brunch at restaurant B is: 
(1 = Extremely inexpensive, 7 = Extremely expensive) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
The Sunday Brunch at restaurant B is: 
(1 = Extremely low-priced, 7 = Extremely high-priced) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please choose one of the following three statements:        
When evaluating the expensiveness of the Sunday Brunch at restaurant B (the first two 
questions on this page):     
 I focused mainly on the $8.95 brunch price. 
 I focused mainly on any applicable tips/surcharges. 
 I focused mainly on the total expense (i.e., the $8.95 brunch price PLUS any applicable 
tips/surcharges). 
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Weight the following statements by allocating 10 chips between them:        
To judge the expensiveness of the Sunday Brunch at restaurant B (the first two 
questions on this page) I used: 
______ 1) The $8.95 brunch price (excluding the 15% mandatory service gratuity) 
______ 2) The 15% mandatory service gratuity 
I expect that the quality of food and service for the Sunday Brunch at restaurant B is: 
(1 = Very poor, 7 = Very high) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I think the flyer for Sunday Brunch at restaurant B is: 
(1 = Very unattractive, 7 = Very attractive) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Which of the following statements best describes the pricing policy used at restaurant 
B for the Sunday Brunch? 
 Tipping is voluntary. Restaurant patrons can leave any amount they deem appropriate. 
They usually leave a 15% tip. 
 Restaurant patrons are required to pay 15% service gratuities on top of the brunch price. 
 The brunch price is all-inclusive, with no additional tips/service charges. 
In fact, restaurant B has a voluntary tipping policy [adds a mandatory 15% service 
gratuity to all checks]. Please use the scales below to express your reactions to that 
voluntary tipping policy [mandatory service gratuity].         
-Voluntary tipping [The mandatory 15% service gratuity] for the Sunday Brunch at 
restaurant B is: 
(1 = Very unfair, 7 = Very fair) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
-Voluntary tipping [The mandatory 15% service gratuity] for the Sunday Brunch at 
restaurant B is: 
(1 = Very unreasonable, 7 = Very reasonable) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
-Voluntary tipping [The mandatory 15% service gratuity] for the Sunday Brunch at 
restaurant B is: 
(1 = Very unjustified, 7 = Very justified) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How much would you voluntarily tip in dollars and cents above and beyond the 
mandatory payment for the $8.95 Sunday Brunch at restaurant B? 
 
Thinking about the country as a whole and not about restaurant B specifically, what is 
the common practice regarding tips/service charges in the country described in the 
scenario? 
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 It is customary for local restaurants to add a 15% mandatory service gratuity. 
 Tipping is voluntary. It is customary to leave 15% as tips. 
 
               Restaurant A                                    Restaurant B 
 
 
Here are the two Sunday Brunch flyers again. Which restaurant would you like to go 
for Sunday Brunch? 
(1 = Definitely Restaurant A, 7 = Definitely Restaurant B) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please answer the following questions based on your personal experience:    
 
If you dine out at a full-service restaurant where tipping is voluntary, what percent 
would you tip for satisfactory food and service at full-service restaurant? 
 
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements:  
(1 = Very much disagree, 7 = Very much agree) 
-The practice of voluntary tipping is more common among upscale restaurants than 
among less expensive ones. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
-The practice of adding automatic gratuities to bills is more common among upscale 
restaurants than among less expensive ones. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
-The practice of including the cost of service in menu prices is more common among 
upscale restaurants than among less expensive ones. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please evaluate the following statements: 
(1 = Very much disagree, 7 = Very much agree) 
-In general, a restaurant tip should be earned, not automatic. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
-I do not like being forced to pay tips at restaurants. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
-Restaurant customers should decide whether to tip and how much to tip. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please tell us about yourself.   
 
How old are you?  
 
What is your gender? 
 Male 
 Female 
What is your race? 
 White/Caucasian 
 African American 
 Hispanic 
 Asian 
 Mixed/Others 
Are you a US citizen or permanent residents? 
 Yes 
 No 
What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 Less than High School 
 High School Graduate 
 Some College 
 College Graduate 
 Post-graduate 
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What is your combined annual household income? 
 Less than 25,000 
 25,001 – 50,000 
 50,001 – 100,000 
 100,001 or more 
Please indicate your familiarity with US restaurant tipping customs: 
(1 = Very unfamiliar, 7 = Very familiar) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
On average, how many times per month do you dine out at full-service restaurants? 
 
   Restaurant B (mandatory gratuity) 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL MECHANISMS FOR PROCESSING PARTITIONED 
PRICE: AN INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK 
 
Introduction 
Price partitioning, the practice of breaking up a single price of a product and/or 
service into two or more mandatory parts and presenting them individually to 
consumers, has been a popular pricing strategy used by many firms. For example, 
catalogue and infomercial companies typically list price of the advertised product 
along with a shipping and handling fee. Internet retailers such as Amazon and 
Drugstore often attach a delivery charge to the subtotal of an online transaction on the 
check out page. In the hospitality industry, the past decade has witnessed a surge of 
various surcharges, from the increasingly popular automatic service gratuities at 
upscale table-service restaurants to the now-widespread fuel surcharges and baggage 
fees on air travel.  
The ubiquitous presence of partitioned prices in the marketplace has long 
attracted a great deal of attention from academia. In particular, a growing body of 
research in behavioral pricing has demonstrated that, contrary to the principle of 
description invariance prescribed by normative economics theory (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981), consumers respond differently to partitioned versus consolidated 
presentation of the same price in terms of perception, evaluation and choice(for a 
recent review, see Morwitz, Greenleaf, Shalev, & Johnson, 2009). There is little 
consensus, however, as to whether partitioned prices would bring about more positive 
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consumer reactions and hence increase a firm’s profitability relative to financially 
equivalent combined prices.  
On the one hand, according to prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) 
and mental accounting principles for compound outcomes (Thaler, 1985, 1999), if 
consumers view each separately listed price they have to pay to acquire a product 
and/or service as a single loss, then they should prefer a combined price over an 
equivalent partitioned price. This is because losses should be integrated rather than 
segregated in order to minimize disutility (Thaler, 1985). Several studies in the price 
bundling literature have provided empirical support for this prediction. For instance, 
using an automobile bundle, Johnson, Herrmann, & Bauer (1999) showed that 
presenting the offer with a consolidated price leads to greater satisfaction and a higher 
likelihood of recommending the offer to other people as well as of repurchasing the 
brand than presenting the offer with separate price tags for each bundle component.  
On the other hand, some researchers suggested that the presence of multiple 
tags in a partitioned price tends to encourage selective attention to and differential 
processing of the secondary price information or its associated benefits. As a result, 
price partitioning can influence consumers’ perceptual judgments and either increase 
or decrease demand relative to price consolidating. In a seminal paper by Morwitz, 
Greenleaf, & Johnson (1998), the researchers demonstrated that dividing the all-
inclusive price of an AT&T telephone sold through a catalog into a base price plus a 
typical shipping and handling fee reduced participants’ recalled total purchase costs 
and increased its choice share relative to a SONY telephone with an all-inclusive price 
available at a local store. Studies in this research stream have since identified and 
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examined a variety of mediators and moderators of the framing effect of price 
partitioning on evaluation and behavioral consequences.  
 
Objectives of the Review  
The aforementioned discussion suggests that behavioral scientists have 
approached the issue of price partitioning from different angles. Due to this 
perspective difference, sometimes complementary and sometimes competing 
explanations of the price partitioning effect on price perception and its downstream 
behavioral implications coexist in the literature. Greater insights would be gained if 
those different psychological mechanisms and the associated moderators can be 
integrated into a unifying conceptual framework. The purpose of this paper is 
therefore to provide a synthetic review of the underlying psychological mechanisms in 
extant price partitioning literature and develop an integrative framework that may 
potentially encompass and explain the varied findings in this area.  
 
Scope of the Review 
Partitioned price, in its original form, consists of two mandatory components: a 
base price and a surcharge. Usually the surcharge represents a service component 
necessary for consumers to acquire, utilize or dispose the product such as a shipping 
and handling fee or a recycling fee. Some researchers, in their study of price 
partitioning effect, also examined cases of price bundling or de-bundling in which two 
or more distinct products in a multi-component bundle are priced together as one 
consolidated price or separately for each bundle component (e.g., a refrigerator and an 
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icemaker). Although Morwitz et al. (1998) and others stressed the differences between 
price partitioning and price debundling, I include studies in both research areas in this 
review for the sake of completeness. However, to facilitate the conceptualization of a 
unifying processing model, I restrict my focus to price debundling studies where all 
bundle components are mandatory and no discount/promotion information (e.g., 
bundle component discount or total bundle savings) are presented.  
 
Organization of the Review 
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. I begin by providing a critical 
review on the various psychological accounts for the price partitioning effect. Next, I 
develop an integrative framework based on the five characteristics of the secondary 
price component (SCP) that helps an individual consumer to choose among the seven 
different processing routes for a partitioned price. I then discuss some contextual and 
individual factors that affect consumers’ perceptions of the characteristics of the SCP 
and thus alter their choice of processing strategies with the backdrop of the integrative 
framework. Finally, a general discussion on contributions, implications and 
suggestions for future research is provided.  
 
Psychological Mechanisms for Processing Partitioned Prices 
Although there is a general consensus that consumers react differently to 
partitioned versus consolidated presentation of the same price, questions remain as to 
what psychological mechanisms drive the observed framing effect of price 
presentation in consumer evaluation and demand.  
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In this section, I present a review of the various theoretical accounts of the 
price partitioning effect identified from the existing literature. I broadly classify them 
into two main categories: mental accounting principles for compound outcomes and 
selective attention and differential processing. The former has its roots in prospect 
theory. The latter and its ramifications lay emphasis on the notion that consumers are 
cognitive misers and often selectively attend to and process available information. 
Figure 3.1 shows a schematic typology of these explanations.  
 
Mental Accounting Principles  
One popular account of the underlying mechanism for processing partitioned 
prices is based on the contention that people perceive the payment of partitioned prices 
(consolidated prices) as multiple events (a single event) and that the way they encode 
and/or edit compound outcomes of those events influences their judgment and choice 
as set forth by prospect theory and mental accounting principles described in details 
below.  
 
Prospect Theory and Mental Accounting Principles   
Kahneman & Tversky (1979) proposed that people generally perceive decision 
outcomes as gains or losses in relation to a reference point. These perceived gains and 
losses are then mapped onto subjective utility via a value function. Evaluations and 
choices are based on the resulting perceived value. Central to prospect theory is a 
value function with three features: (1) outcomes are framed as gains or losses relative 
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         Figure 3.1 A schematic typology of psychological accounts for the price partitioning effect 
Mental 
accounting   
principles for 
compound 
outcomes 
 
Selective 
attention and 
differential 
processing  
 
Psychological 
accounts of the 
price 
partitioning 
effect 
Underline the surcharge 
or its benefits 
Conditional on the 
perceived fairness of 
the surcharge  
Disregard the surcharge 
 
Conditional on the 
perceived value of 
the surcharge 
Discount the surcharge 
 
Integrate losses 
Lower perceived 
total price 
 
Component prices as 
separate losses 
Component prices as 
proxies for separate 
gains 
Discrepancies between 
component price and its 
reference as separate 
losses or gains Segregate gains 
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to a reference point; (2) the function is concave in the domain of gains and convex in 
the domain of losses (i.e., positive diminishing returns to marginal gains and negative 
diminishing returns to marginal losses); (3) the function for losses is steeper than that 
for gains (i.e., people strongly prefer avoiding losses to acquiring gains of the same 
magnitude). These properties yield an asymmetric S-shaped value function.  
Thaler (1985) extended prospect theory of a single event to explain how people 
encode compound (joint) outcomes of multiple events. Although people may evaluate 
the component outcomes together or separately, he suggests that due to the special 
characteristics of the value function a person can attain greater value from a particular 
set of compound outcomes if he or she follows the four mental accounting principles: 
1. Segregation is preferred for multiple gains; 
2. Integration is preferred for multiple losses; 
3. When outcomes involve both gains and losses but gains outweigh losses, 
integration is preferred for this mixed gain; 
4. When outcomes involve both gains and losses but losses outweigh gains, 
segregation is preferred for a large gap between gains and losses (e.g., a 
$40 gain and a $6000 loss) and integration is preferred if there is a smaller 
gap between gains and losses (e.g., a $40 gain and a $50 loss).  
 
Encoding and Editing the Gains and Losses for Partitioned Prices 
The four mental accounting principles for compound outcomes have been 
backed up by both anecdotal evidence and empirical tests (Thaler, 1999). It is 
suggested, however, that people may encode the same outcome (i.e., a loss or a gain) 
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quite differently depending on the specific reference points they use in a decision 
problem (Fischhoff, 1983). In addition, they often edit the presented decision frames 
for cognitive or hedonic reasons(Thaler & Johnson, 1990). Therefore, even though 
mental accounting principles generally hold true, the same decision problem can lead 
to inconsistent results due to a different encoding and editing of compound outcomes.  
A closer scrutiny of price bundling literature revealed that there is indeed less 
consensus among researchers on what constituted losses and gains in evaluating a 
price bundling offer. For example, several researchers assumed that consumers encode 
a price or payment as a monetary loss (Drumwright, 1992; Johnson et al., 1999; 
Hyeong Min Kim, 2006). In that case, the multiple price components in a partitioned 
price represent multiple losses whereas the equivalent consolidated price represents a 
single loss. Because the value function is convex in the domain of losses, multiple 
losses should be perceived as lower if they are integrated into a single loss. This 
theorizing leads to the prediction that, all else being equal, consumers should respond 
more favorably to consolidated rather than partitioned presentation of a bundle price.  
Although Chakravarti, Krish, Paul, & Srivastava (2002) shared the same view 
on encoding prices as losses, they argued that consumers also tend to edit (reframe) 
the presented price information. They suggested that consumers exposed to partitioned 
bundle prices may first add up component prices to determine the total bundle price 
and then encode the “edited” price as a single loss. This editing would render the 
mental account on the loss side (price) identical, regardless of whether there is a single 
price tag for the bundle or separate price tags for each bundle component. In contrast, 
they argued that different price presentations are likely to affect the gain (i.e., 
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component benefit) side of the mental account. Consumers usually code and evaluate 
component benefits separately. But in the consolidated bundle price scenario, they are 
more likely to integrate component benefits and evaluate them as a whole because 
“consolidated presentations may encourage holistic evaluation of the bundle 
component benefits”(Chakravarti et al., 2002, p. 217-218). According to the metal 
accounting principle, segregated gains are perceived larger than the integrated ones of 
the same scale because of the concavity of the value function. Therefore, with 
identical perceived losses, consumers would evaluate bundling offerings more 
favorably when prices are partitioned among bundle components than when prices are 
consolidated.  
One potential drawback with the application of prospect theory and metal 
accounting principle to the price bundling context as described above is the coding of 
price as monetary loss. Thaler (1985) claimed that loss aversion makes the coding of 
the forgone money (i.e., cost) as a loss hedonically inefficient because of the high 
coefficient of loss aversion (estimated at 2.25). In the same vein, Kahneman & 
Tversky (1984) also cautioned that payments consumers make to acquire products 
and/or services should not be viewed as uncompensated losses. Instead, they proposed 
that price should be treated as proxies for the consumption benefits of the goods 
acquired. If this is the case, the mental accounting principle of segregating multiple 
gains implies that consumers should prefer partitioned prices over consolidated prices 
in evaluating a bundle offer.  
Another conceptualization of losses and gains in the price bundling context is 
derived from the concept of reference price and transaction utility (Thaler, 1985, 
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1999). Some researchers suggested that when evaluating a partitioned bundle prices, 
consumers first use the expected price of each partitioned bundle component and 
compare it with the posted component price (Janiszewski & Cunha, 2004; Kaicker, 
Bearden, & Manning, 1995; Mazumdar & Jun, 1993). This comparison process gives 
rise to positive transaction utility (i.e., gains) when the reference price of the bundle 
component is lower than the posted price or negative transaction utility (i.e., losses) 
when the reference price of the bundle component is higher than the posted price. 
Consumers then evaluate the joint outcome of individual comparisons according to 
mental accounting principles. For instance, when a consumer’s expected price for each 
bundle component is lower than the posted bundle price (i.e., a case of multiple gains), 
he or she would prefer partitioned prices over corresponding consolidated prices 
because multiple gains result in a higher transaction utility when they are segregated 
than when they are integrated.  
Table 3.1 presents selected studies in the price bundling area with different 
conceptualizations of losses and gains and their predictions according to relevant 
mental accounting principles. 
 
Limitations of the Mental Accounting Explanations 
Although the aforementioned studies provide some empirical support for the 
mental accounting explanations of the price partitioning effect, there are several 
limitations to this line of work. First, as discussed earlier, there is considerable lack of 
agreement among researchers on what constitute losses and gains in the price 
partitioning context, which sometimes leads to inconsistent predictions. In addition, 
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Table 3.1 Different Conceptualizations of Gains and Losses and Implications for Price Bundling  
Author(s ) Price format Loss(es) Gain(s) Predictions 
Chakravarti et al. 
(2002) 
 
 
 
Consolidated 
Price 
 
 
 
 
Partitioned 
price 
The total price as 
a single loss  
 
 
 
 
The sum of 
component prices 
(total price) as a 
single loss  
 
The sum of 
component 
benefits as an 
integrated single 
gain (holistic 
evaluation) 
Each individual 
component 
benefit as a 
separate gain 
 
Segregate gains: 
partitioned prices are 
preferred over 
consolidated prices  
 
 
 
 
Drumwright 
(1992) 
 
 
 
Consolidated 
Price 
 
 
Partitioned 
price 
 
The total price as 
a single loss  
 
 
Each individual 
component price 
as a separate loss 
 
Each individual 
component 
benefit as a 
separate gain 
Ditto  
 
Integrate losses: 
consolidated prices 
are preferred over 
partitioned prices 
Kahneman and 
Tversky (1984) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Johnson et al. 
(1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
Consolidated 
Price 
 
 
Partitioned 
price 
 
 
 
Consolidated 
Price 
 
Partitioned 
price 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The total price as 
a single loss  
 
Each individual 
component price 
as a separate loss 
 
The total price as 
a proxy for the 
integrated 
component gains 
The component 
prices as proxies 
for separate 
component gains 
 
N/A 
Segregate gains: 
partitioned prices are 
preferred over 
consolidated prices  
 
 
 
 
 
Integrate losses: 
consolidated prices 
are preferred over 
partitioned prices 
Kaicker et al. 
(1995)  
  
Consolidated 
Price 
 
 
 
 
 
Partitioned 
price 
The negative 
difference 
between the total 
price and the sum 
of component 
reference prices 
as a single gain 
The negative 
difference 
between 
individual 
component price 
and its reference 
price as a separate 
gain  
The positive 
difference 
between the total 
price and the sum 
of component 
reference prices as 
a single loss 
The positive 
difference 
between 
individual 
component price 
and its reference 
price as a separate 
loss 
Partitioned prices are 
preferred over 
consolidated prices 
with multiple gains 
and high net loss; 
consolidated prices 
are preferred over 
partitioned prices with 
multiple losses (not 
supported), mixed 
gains, and low net loss 
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recent work on behavioral pricing has provided some contradictory evidence on both 
the postulation that consumers code prices paid for goods as losses (Novemsky & 
Kahneman, 2005) and the conceptualization of losses and gains as the discrepancies 
between the observed price and the expected price (Kaicker et al., 1995). Research on 
the pain of paying (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1998) also suggests that consumers might 
not treat prices simply as value tags for the component benefits (i.e., gains) as 
advocated by Kahneman & Tversky (1984).  
 Another problem with the mental accounting interpretation of the price 
partitioning effect is the (implicit) assumption that consumers will attend to and 
process both the primary and secondary price information in their evaluation. This is 
often not the case. For example, Kim (2006) demonstrated that the integration-of-
losses principle prevails only when the surcharges are visually salient and easy to 
process. However, when consumers must retrieve a partitioned from memory to make 
decisions, they tend to recall the base price, which is most prominent among price 
components, but ignore the surcharge. Consequently, in the latter case, consolidated 
prices lead to less favorable evaluation than partitioned prices of comparable amount, 
an opposite pattern predicted by the mental accounting principles. 
Finally, even though I assume that consumers pay adequate attention to all 
price components in a partitioned price, they do not necessarily treat them as separate 
entities as stipulated by the mental accounting principles. For example, Morwitz et al. 
(1998) showed that a significant number of participants in their study employed 
processing strategies to combine the shipping and handling fee with the catalogue 
price of the telephone to work out the total price, presumably because they regard the 
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shipping and handling fee as an add-on cost to the focal product. In contrast, when 
price components in a partitioned price correspond to individual physical products as 
in a typical price bundle, consumers are more likely to process the price of each 
component separately and then combine them according to mental accounting 
principles. This may help explain why empirical support for the mental accounting 
explanation of price partitioning was mainly found in the price bundling literature. 
 
Selective Attention and Differential Processing 
A different stream of research on the price partitioning effect emphasizes the 
fact that people are cognitive misers and that they generally are not motivated to fully 
and completely process all the information available to them (Garbarino & Edell, 1997; 
Taylor & Fiske, 1978). Accordingly, when consumers evaluate a partitioned price, 
they are more likely to focus on the primary price component and insufficiently 
process or ignore the secondary price components (Morwitz et al., 1998).    
On the other hand, dividing a price into several parts and listing them 
individually can also make the secondary price components and their associated 
benefits more visually salient and hence draw increased attention from consumers 
(Bertini & Wathieu, 2008). Under certain circumstances, the characteristics of the 
secondary price components or the benefits associated with them may act as a primary 
driver to shift consumers’ preference. In the following section, I organized my 
discussion of the price partitioning effect on choice and demand as a result of 
consumers’ selective attention and differential processing by three pertinent mediators.  
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Perceived/Recalled Total Price 
 Several researchers argued that the presence of multiple price components in a 
partitioned price for a product and/or service may cause consumers to ignore or 
discount the surcharge in their assessment of an offer (Estelami, 2003; Morwitz et al., 
1998). Drawing upon the cost/benefit framework(Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Shugan, 
1980), Morwitz et al. (2003) proposed three major processing strategies and claimed 
that a customer would choose a particular strategy to determine the total price if the 
strategy’s perceived benefit (i.e., the expected utility gain resulting from a certain level 
of expected accuracy in recognizing total price) outweighs the perceived cost (i.e., the 
time and cognitive effort required to process the price information on the expected 
accuracy level). Specifically, customers are expected to adopt one of the following 
processing strategies when interpreting partitioned prices: 
1. Calculate the arithmetical sum of the base price and the surcharge. 
This full-processing strategy requires the most amount of cognitive effort, but 
leads to most precise total price recognition. As a result, there should be no difference 
in total price perception or recall among customers regardless of whether the price is 
partitioned or combined.  
2. Resort to low-effort heuristics to discount the surcharge. 
If a consumer does not think it is worthy to calculate the total price by adding the 
base price and the surcharge precisely, he or she is likely to use such heuristic 
shortcuts as anchoring and adjustment (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) to integrate 
different price components. That is, the consumer tends to anchor on the primary price 
component that is salient and important (e.g., the base price) and then subjectively 
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modify it to account for the less salient secondary price components (e.g., the 
surcharges) in a decreasing order of perceived importance. However, the adjustments 
are usually inadequate, leading to an underestimate of the total price. 
3. Completely disregard the surcharge. 
In some cases, customers may simply ignore the surcharge, either by failing to 
notice the surcharge information or by noticing the surcharge but not incorporating it 
when estimating the total price. The former case may happen when the secondary 
price components are less salient compared with the primary price component. The 
latter case is likely to be true when consumers believe that the secondary price 
components are negligible, and that incorporating this additional information does not 
lead to a better decision. This strategy requires results in the lowest perceived total 
prices among the three strategies.  
Through a controlled experiment, Morwitz et al. (1998) found that on average 
more than half of the subjects (54.8%) used heuristic strategy to process partitioned 
prices. People who completely ignored the surcharge (23.2%) and who used 
mathematical calculations (21.9%) in processing separated price information 
accounted jointly for the rest. Because the majority of the customers either discount or 
ignore the surcharge, even though some customers engage in accurate numerical 
calculation, on average, the recalled total costs were lower among customers who saw 
the partitioned prices than those who saw the corresponding combined prices. Based 
on these results, they concluded that partitioned pricing can reduce consumers’ 
perceptions of total purchase costs and thus increase demand.  
Lee and Han (2002), in investigating the negative attitudinal effect of price 
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partitioning, also found that participants underestimated the total costs for electronic 
products (computers and stereo equipment) when they were priced with a separate 
price for delivery and installation than when they were priced with a combined price 
of the equivalent amount. Their study showed that consumers exposed to partitioned 
prices recalled total price that were approximately 8% lower than the actual amount.  
 
Perceived Fairness of the Secondary Price Component 
 Price fairness has been defined as a judgment of whether a price is reasonable, 
acceptable, or justifiable (Bolton, Warlop, & Alba, 2003; Lichtenstein & Bearden, 
1989; Xia, Monroe, & Cox, 2004). Although price fairness research has traditionally 
focused on consumer fairness perception of uni-dimensional prices (i.e., a single price 
tag for a product and/or service) or price changes (Alba & Bolton, 2006; Bolton et al., 
2003; Campbell, 1999, 2007), the increasing prevalence of price partitioning strategy 
has inspired a number of researchers to examine the role perceived fairness plays in 
consumers’ evaluation of partitioned prices. To that end, it has demonstrated that 
perceived fairness of the surcharge can influence consumers’ willingness to bid and 
shift preference between financially equivalent partitioned prices and consolidated 
prices (Haws & Bearden, 2006; Sheng, Bao, & Pan, 2007). Consequently, perceived 
fairness of the surcharge appears to be a key determinant of whether or not the 
partitioning strategy is more preferable to the bundling strategy. However, some 
researchers also showed that seller reputation (Cheema, 2008) and consumers’ 
knowledge or belief about firms’ manipulative intent (Kachersky & Kim, 2010) can 
override the impact of perceived surcharge fairness on evaluation and demand.  
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Perceived Value of the Secondary Price Component 
Taking a different approach to understanding price partitioning effect, Bertini 
& Wathieu (2008) argued that the impact of price partitioning on choice and demand 
is not exclusively driven by the price perception per se. Through four experiments, 
they showed that individual price tags in a partitioned price could encourage 
consumers to pay more attention to the secondary attributes or benefits that may go 
unnoticed under an all-inclusive price. As a result, the perceived value of the 
secondary component may play a key role in offer evaluation and can stimulate or 
dampen demand. By manipulating the perceived benefits of the secondary component 
while holding the partitioned price constant, they showed that when the secondary 
component’s perceived benefit outweighed the perceived cost (i.e. a good deal), 
participants rated the partitioned offer as more attractive than a baseline all-inclusive 
offer and hence chose the former more often than the latter. However, this pattern was 
reversed when the secondary component of the partitioned offer was perceived as a 
bad deal. In addition, they found that the differential impact of different price formats 
on demand was attenuated when the importance of secondary components tagged with 
individual price were high or when consumers found the secondary components were 
difficult to evaluate.  
Similarly, Hamilton & Srivastava (2008) suggested that price partitioning often 
induces consumers to focus on and assess the perceived value of partitioned 
components. Consequently, the relative benefit consumers believe they will get from 
those components may shift their preferences for different partitions of the same total 
price. They further demonstrated that the perceived benefit of the secondary 
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component in a partitioned offer can be influenced by consumers’ usage situations and 
consumption goals.  
In an early study by Chakravarti et al. (2002), the authors varied the 
component partitioned from a refrigerator bundle either as a consumption-related (i.e., 
ice maker) or a performance-related (i.e., a service warranty) element. They found that 
partitioning increases the salience of the benefits or risks of the component partitioned 
and this increased salience has important implications for bundle evaluation and 
choice. That is, consumers have more favorable evaluations and higher choice 
proportions when an ice maker is partitioned than when a service warranty is 
partitioned. This finding lent further support to the contention that price partitioning 
can direct consumers’ attention to the component partitioned as Well as lead 
consumers to elaborate more on the attributes highlighted by the partitioned 
component.  
 
How Consumers Process Partitioned Prices: An Integrative Framework 
The above discussion has revealed that different psychological mechanisms 
have been proposed to explain the price partitioning effect on choice and demand. 
Although each of them has its own theoretical merits and is supported by empirical 
evidence, questions remain as to how and why a specific mechanism brings about the 
price partitioning effect under certain conditions but not under the others.  
  
The Characteristics of the Secondary Price Component  
 Building upon previous research on price partitioning, I put forward an 
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integrative framework of partitioned price processing that helps differentiate among 
various psychological mechanisms responsible for the price partitioning effect. I 
suggest that although multiple processing pathways coexist when a consumer faces a 
partitioned price, he or she will take a specific route depending on the salience, 
diagnosticity, importance, processing difficulty and integrativeness of the secondary 
price component (hereinafter: SPC) of the partitioned price. I discuss each of the five 
characteristics in details below.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
The Salience of the SPC 
 In my framework, I define the salience of the SPC of a partitioned price as the 
extent to which it draws consumers’ attention so that they are less inclined to disregard 
the SPC in their price evaluation. The most important factor influences the salience of 
the SPC is the intensity of its visual presentation (Kim & Kachersky, 2006). 
Supposedly, consumers are less likely to ignore and more likely to attend to the SPC 
when it is presented in large print or a dramatic color. In addition, the novelty or 
unexpectedness of the SPC also plays a role in defining its salience. For example, 
consumers are often oblivious to routine surcharges such as sales tax. However, if an 
online retailer posted a surcharge with a less common label like “convenience fees”, 
consumers may pay more attention to them and give them more thoughts.  
 
The Diagnosticity of the SPC 
 The diagnosticity of the SPC in a partitioned price refers to the divergence of 
the SPC from an Well-defined reference level or reference range. I argue that when the 
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diagnosticity of the SPC is sufficiently high, consumers tend to use it as the primary 
evaluation base and their aggregate judgment and preference will be biased toward it. 
In contrast, when the diagnosticity of the SPC is low, consumers may not attain an 
adequate degree of judgment confidence with the assessment of that price component 
alone and may need to seek additional information to form an overall price perception. 
 The diagnosticity of the SPC is closely related to the concept of reference price 
or price range, the standard against which an observed price is evaluated (Monroe, 
1973). By definition, the diagnositicy of the SPC should first depend on whether a 
consumer has a Well-defined reference price or price range of the SPC. When a 
consumer finds it difficult to evaluate the SPC because of the lack of comparative 
standards, he or she may need to turn to other price information to evaluate the overall 
price (Bertini & Wathieu, 2008).  
 On the other hand, the existence of a clear reference price or price range of the 
SPC does not guarantee its high diagnositicy. Rather, I proposed that the diagnosticity 
of the SPC is further determined by how much it deviates from its reference. Extant 
pricing literature suggests that divergence from a reference price can induce evaluative 
judgments such as perceived transaction value (Thaler, 1985, 1999) and perceived 
price fairness (Xia & Monroe, 2010). In addition, the further the observed price 
deviates from its reference, the more polarized the evaluations tend to be. 
Consequently, I argue that the SPC with a higher degree of digression from its 
reference should have a stronger diagnosticity.  
 Finally, the diagnosticity of the SPC can be influenced by benefit as well as 
price information. That is, SPCs where benefits deviate from a well defined reference 
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level of benefits are more diagnostic than those where benefits do not deviate from 
expectations. It has been suggested that price partitioning makes the link between cost 
and benefits for each price component explicit (Chakravarti et al., 2002). 
Consequently, when consumers associate a standard package of consumption benefits 
with the SPC, then any discrepancy between the package coming with the SPC and its 
reference can lead to positive or negative value judgments on the benefits associated 
with the SPC and shift their overall preference.  
 
The Importance of the SPC 
In my framework, when consumers attend to and perceive both primary and 
secondary price information in their price evaluation, the relative decision weight of 
the SPC in the overall evaluation and choice is partially determined by its importance. 
It has been suggested that when the SPC is within its reference range, its importance is 
positively related to its relative magnitude to the primary price component (hereinafter: 
PPC). Xia & Monroe (2004) maintained that people tend to inadequately process small 
surcharges because whether to integrate them to the base price does not make a 
significant difference in price judgment or decision making. When the relative 
magnitude of the surcharge is large, however, it represents a significant part of the 
base price and becomes a non-trivial part of the total purchase cost. Therefore, 
consumers may become motivated to process the surcharges more thoroughly and 
accurately.  
 
The Processing Difficulty of the SPC 
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When the SPC is high in salience but low in diagnosticity and importance, the 
extent to which consumers will take it into consideration depends on how difficult it is 
for them to process. Presumably, consumers should be more motivate to take into 
account the SPC in their price evaluation when consolidate the SPC into the PPC 
involves little computational complexity (e.g., a round number). 
 Previous research has suggested that, as a general rule, it is more difficult to 
process information presented in proportions than in raw units (Estelami, 2003). For 
example, when the surcharge is presented as a percentage of the base price, both a 
multiplication and an addition are needed to calculate the total cost, which requires 
more cognitive efforts than when the surcharge is presented as a dollar amount. 
Consequently, relative to an equivalent dollar surcharge, consumers are more likely to 
use simple heuristics to process the percentage surcharge or ignore it altogether, 
leading to a lower recalled total price and/or a higher purchase intention (Kim & 
Kramer, 2006).  
Morwitz et al. (1998) provided empirical support for this contention. The 
results of their second study showed that although there was no significant difference 
in the percentage of participants who used the heuristic strategy to process the 
partitioned price between the percentage surcharge (54.8%) and the dollar surcharge 
conditions (54.9%), the percentage of participants who simply ignored the surcharge 
were significantly higher for the former (35.6%) than for the latter (12.2%). As a result, 
participants recalled a lower total cost when the surcharge was present in percentage 
term ($75.43) than in a dollar amount ($80.36).  
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The Integrativeness of the SPC 
 The integrativeness of the SPC is critical in determining whether consumers 
will resort to mental accounting principles in their partitioned price evaluation. When 
the integrativeness is high, consumers tend to combine the partitioned price 
components first and then evaluate them as a whole. On the contrary, when the 
integrativeness is low, consumers will view each price component as a separate entity 
and are more likely to evaluate them individually and then use relevant mental 
accounting principles to arrive at the compound outcome.  
 As I discussed previously, the integrateiveness of the SPC should depend on its 
affiliation with the PPC. For example, when the SPC represents a service component 
required for consumers to obtain or use the product, its integrativeness should be high. 
On the other hand, when the SPC corresponds to a bundled physical product that can 
be sold independently, as in the typical cases of price bundling, its integrativeness 
should be low.  
 
An Integrative Framework of Partitioned Price Processing 
 I now describe an integrative framework on how an individual consumer 
choose among different processing routes to perceive and evaluate a partitioned price 
with the five characteristics of the SPC acting as a series of route signs (please see 
figure 3.2). The first characteristic that influences individuals’ choice of processing 
routes is the salience of the SPC. Conceivably, consumers need to first attend to and 
perceive the SPC before considering it in their price evaluation. However, because 
people have limited working memory capacity, they often exert selective attention 
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(Berlyne, 1960), focusing on prominent stimuli and ignoring less salient ones. 
Consequently, when the salience of the SPC is low, consumers may be oblivious to its 
existence and their total price perception is based on the PPC only (Route 1).  
 Kim (2006) examined the interaction effect between the format of surcharge 
and the visual salience of surcharge. He showed that the presentation effect of dollar 
versus percentage surcharge prevailed only when the surcharge font is the same as the 
base price font. When the visual salience of the surcharge decreased with the use of 
smaller font, no presentation effect observed, presumably because of participants’ 
failure to attend to the surcharge information in the first place. 
 When the SPC is salient enough to attract consumers’ attention, the 
diagnosticity of the SPC will exert an impact on consumers’ further selection of 
processing mechanisms. In my proposed model, the SPC is highly diagnostic if it 
deviates from a Well-defined reference price or price range. It is suggested that 
consumers often use their fairness perceptions of the SPC resulting from price 
deviation as the primary evaluation base such that their preferences are shifted by their 
perceived fairness of the SPC (Route 2) (Burman & Biswas, 2007; Cheema, 2008; 
Kachersky & Kim, 2010; Sheng et al., 2007). For example, Sheng et al. (2007) 
manipulated both the absolute and relative level of the surcharge to induce perception 
of (un)fairness of the surcharge among undergraduates. In the first study, they showed 
that participants have higher purchase intention when the surcharge was low but lower 
purchase intention when the surcharge was high compared with corresponding 
consolidated prices. However, partitioned versus consolidated pricing did not 
influence demand when surcharge was at the moderate level, presumably because the 
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modest surcharge was within its reference range and did not bring on any fairness 
perception. In a second study, the authors kept the surcharge constant across 
conditions but varied the base price and found results suggesting that consumers use 
the base prices as a reference that can affect the diagnosticity of the surcharge. In the 
low base price condition (i.e., relatively high surcharge), the shipping and handling 
charges for a digital watch was price higher than the price for the watch itself, leading 
to a more negative reaction to price partitioning than to price consolidating. The 
opposite is true when the base price was greater than the surcharge. The findings 
demonstrated that the relative magnitude of the surcharge to the base price can also 
influence surcharge fairness perception as well as purchase intention.     
 Extant research has also suggested that the benefit based diagnosticity of the 
SPC can influence consumers’ overall assessment of a partitioned price as well (Route 
3) (Bertini & Wathieu, 2008; Gaeth, Levin, Chakraborty, & Levin, 1991; Hamilton & 
Srivastava, 2008). Specifically, ceteris paribus, the more consumption benefits 
consumers associate with the SPC, the higher perceived value they derive from the 
SPC, which in turn shape their overall price evaluation. For instance, holding the 
surcharge and the base price constant, Bertini and Wathieu (2008) showed that when 
the delivery service provided by an online grocer offers more benefits to customers in 
terms of wider choice and more flexibility, the partitioned presentation of a $86 
shopping basket subtotal plus a $9 scheduling service fee induced better offer 
perception and higher purchase intention than the combined presentation of a $95 all-
inclusive price. However, the opposite pattern was true when consumers thought the 
delivery service were inconvenient.  
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Although both the price and the benefit information of the SPC can have a 
significant impact on a consumer’s choice and demand, I believe that he or she will 
focus on the more diagnostic of the two (i.e., either Route 2 or Route 3). For example, 
when consumers do not have a well-defined reference price for the SPC or when the 
SPC falls within its reference range, they may instead evaluate the partitioned price 
based on whether the SPC conveys more or less consumption benefits relative to a 
reference transaction (Bertini & Wathieu, 2008) or in a particular consumption 
situation (Hamilton & Srivastava, 2008).  
In cases where the SPC has high salience but low diagnosticity, consumers 
may turn to both the primary and secondary price information in their overall 
evaluation. However, as cognitive misers (Taylor & Fiske, 1978), they are usually less 
motivated to fully and accurately process all information available to them. I hence 
propose that when the SPC is relatively unimportant, probably due to its small 
magnitude relative to the PPC, consumers are predisposed to process the SPC 
inadequately or even ignore it altogether when the processing difficulty of the SPC is 
high (Route 4). Some researchers also suggested that consumers are less likely to 
apply mental accounting principles with complex percentage-based pricing frames 
(Heath, Chatterjee, & France, 1995) or memory-based price evaluations (Kim, 2006). 
I further argue that when the SPC is low in both importance and processing 
difficulty (e.g., a relatively small and easy-to-calculate surcharge), the integrativeness 
of the SPC should determine whether consumers will evaluate a partitioned price by 
simple arithmetic calculation or according to appropriate mental accounting principles. 
When product components behind individual price tag in a partitioned price 
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correspond to separate physical commodities as in the cases of price bundling, 
consumers are more likely to use mental accounting principles to evaluate a 
partitioned price (Route 5). On the other hand, when the SPC represents an add-on 
charge for a service component necessary to acquire, consume or dispose the focal 
product (e.g., a shipping fee), consumers tend to add individual price components 
together before evaluating the total price (Route 6). It should be noted that when the 
SPC is a whole number or can be treated as one by rounding up (e.g., 39.95) the two 
processing routes have different implications. Whereas the price partitioning effect 
remains when consumers employ mental accounting principles (Route 5), there will be 
no differences between price partitioning and price consolidating if consumers use a 
calculation strategy to process the partitioned price (Route 6).  
As a final point, when the SPC is high in relative importance (e.g., a relatively 
large surcharge), the benefits gained with a more accurate and complete price 
evaluation will outweigh the cost of spending additional cognitive efforts to 
adequately deal with the SPC. Consequently, I argue that consumers will opt for full-
processing mode by precisely calculating the total price as the arithmetic sum of both 
price components, thus potentially eliminating the price partitioning effect (Route 7). 
For example, Xia & Monroe (2004) suggested that the presentation effect of 
percentage versus dollar surcharge may only occur when the surcharge is a small 
amount relative to the base price (i.e., low importance). People tend to ignore or 
discount small surcharges because they are inconsequential in price evaluation. When 
the relative magnitude of the surcharge is large, however, it represents a significant 
part of the base price and becomes a non-trivial part of the total purchase cost. 
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Therefore, consumers may become motivated to process the surcharges more carefully 
and accurately even if they are difficult to process (i.e., in percentage format). In their 
first study, Xia & Monroe (2004) found that when the surcharge amount was small 
(either 6% of the base price or $72) for a $1200 desktop, purchase intentions were 
higher for percentage surcharges than for dollar surcharges. However, when the 
surcharge amount was large relative to the $1133 base price (either 12% or $136), the 
presentation effect of surcharges disappeared. Participants indicated similar purchase 
intentions across conditions.  
 
Factors Influence Consumers’ Perceptions on the Characteristics of the SPC 
 Up to this point, I have identified five characteristics of the SPC and proposed 
an integrative framework of partitioned price processing from the perspective of an 
individual consumer. I argued that the five characteristics of the SPC jointly can 
decide which of the seven processing routes an individual consumer will take when he 
or she is exposed to a partitioned price. However, the extant literature suggests that a 
variety of factors other than the five identified characteristics may alter a consumers’ 
processing strategy. Below I discuss those other factors in the setting of my integrative 
framework of partitioned price processing. Specifically, I argue that the effects of 
these other factors either identify boundary conditions of the model or are due to the 
ways that change perceptions of one or more of the key SPC characteristics in the 
model (please see table 3.2). 
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Table 3.2: Factors influence consumers’ perceptions on the characteristics of the SPC 
Price Stimuli  Salience of the 
SPC 
Diagnosticity of the 
SPC 
Importance of the 
SPC 
Processing Difficulty 
of the SPC 
Integrativeness 
of the SPC 
Processing 
Route 
Burman & Biswas (2007): For a 21-
day advance purchase of an airline 
ticket $288.50 all-inclusive vs. 
249.00 for ticket + 39.50 taxes and 
processing fees 
High salience: 
Low NFC 
Low diagnosticity: 
reasonable surcharge 
Low importance:  Low processing 
difficulty: rounding up 
as $40  
High 
integrativeness: 
tax surcharges 
Route 6 
Low salience: 
High NFC 
reduces the 
perceived 
salience  
N/A N/A N/A N/A Route 1 
Schindler et al., (2005): For a table 
lamp $80 and no shipping charge vs. 
$65 plus $15 shipping charge 
(External reference price: $65 for 
similar lamps in retail stores) 
High salience: 
shipping-
charge 
skeptics 
High diagnosticity: 
shipping-charge 
skepticism enhances the 
perceived diagnosticity 
N/A N/A N/A Route 2 
Low salience: 
low shipping-
charge 
skepticism 
reduces the 
perceived 
salience  
N/A N/A N/A N/A Route 1 
Cheema (2008): For a LCD computer 
monitor $339.99 plus $13.25 S&H or 
$309.99 plus $43.25 S&H 
High salience: 
bad seller 
reputation 
increases the 
perceived 
salience 
(High salience: 
surcharges 
were visually 
salient even for 
good seller 
reputation 
condition) 
High diagnosticity: low 
reputation seller with 
either fair or unfair 
surcharges (especially 
for high NFC)  
N/A N/A N/A Route 2 
Low diagnosticity: high 
reputation seller with 
either fair or unfair 
surcharges (especially 
for high NFC);  
 
Seller reputation may 
override the perceived 
diagnosticity for low 
NFC  
 
Low importance: 
relative low level of 
surcharge  
Low processing 
difficulty: rounding up 
or down 
High 
integrativeness: 
S&H fee is an 
integrated part 
of the offer  
Route 6 
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Kachersky & Kim (2011): For a MPS 
player $189.95 plus $10 shipping  or 
$139.95 plus $60 shipping vs. 
$199.95 all-inclusive (participants 
were made to believe that firms use 
partitioned prices to draw consumers’ 
attention to the base price but not to 
the surcharge)               
High salience High diagnosticity: 
unfair surcharges for 
those who have price-
persuasion knowledge 
on price consolidating 
N/A N/A N/A Route 2 
Low diagnosticity: 
individual price-
persuasion knowledge 
on price partitioning 
overrides the perceived 
diagnosticity 
Low importance 
(for $10): low level 
of surcharge  
High importance 
(for $60): high level 
of surcharge 
Low processing 
difficulty: easy 
calculate numbers 
 
 
N/A 
High 
integrativeness: 
shipping is an 
integrated part 
of the offer  
N/A 
Route 6 
 
 
 
 
Route 7 
Burman & Biswas (2007): For a MP3 
player $199.00 plus $8.95 S&H or 
$189.00 plus $18.95 S&H vs. an all-
inclusive price of $208.00 
High salience High diagnosticity: high 
NFC enhances the 
perceived diagnosticity 
N/A N/A N/A Route 2 
Low diagnosticity: low 
NFC decreases the 
perceived diagnosticity 
Low importance: 
relative low level of 
surcharge  
Low processing 
difficulty 
High 
integrativeness: 
S&H fee is an 
integrated part 
of the offer  
Route 6 
Morwitz et al., (1998): For a AT&T 
telephone $69.95+$12.95 s&h or 
$69.95+18.5% s&h or $82.90 incl 
s&h vs. a SONY telephone $64.95 
High salience Low Diagnosticity  High importance: 
moderate brand 
affect 
 
N/A N/A Route 7 
Low importance:  
High & low brand 
affect 
High processing 
difficulty: percentage 
surcharge  
N/A Route 4 
Kim & Kramer (2006): For a AT&T 
telephone AT&T $64.99+$12.49 
shipping vs. $64.99+19.2% shipping 
High salience Low Diagnosticity Low importance: 
relative low level of 
surcharge  
High processing 
difficulty: percentage 
surcharge for low 
NFC  
 Route 4 
Low processing 
difficulty: percentage 
surcharge for high 
NFC; dollar 
surcharge for both 
High 
integrativeness 
Route 6 
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Factors Influence the Salience of the SPC 
Need for Cognition (NFC). Need for cognition (hereinafter: NFC) refers to 
“the tendency of individuals to engage in and enjoy thinking” (Cacioppo & Petty, 
1982, p. 116). NFC influences the extent to which people encode and process 
information. Consumers with high NFC are intrinsically motivated to search for, 
acquire and process information in a systematic way whereas low NFC consumers are 
more likely to pay attention to easy-to-process cues (e.g., sales signs or seller 
reputation) and process information heuristically.  
 Burman & Biswas (2007) examined how NFC influences the impact of price 
partitioning on perceived value and willingness to purchase. They found that, for a 
reasonable surcharge, high NFC participants had higher willingness to purchase when 
the price was partitioned versus combined. To explain this finding, they suggested that 
although high NFC participants can accurately figure out the total purchase cost, they 
are more likely to see reasonable surcharges “as an inherent expenses associated with 
the purchase situation” and hence only focus on the base price when evaluating the 
offer (Route 1). Thus, high NFC can reduce the salience of the SPC. 
 
 Individual Surcharge Skepticism. Schindler, Morrin, & Bechwati (2005) 
examined how consumers’ inferred profit motive for shipping charges influences their 
reactions to partitioned prices. They argued that consumers may be different in their 
“shipping-charge skepticism” scale so that some consumers perceive shipping charges 
as unfair profit sources while others are less skeptical. They found that when an 
external reference price for the focal product (i.e., a table lamp) was provided, less 
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skeptical participants preferred partitioned prices over combined prices. The opposite 
pattern was true for more skeptical participants. These results are consistent with the 
notion that surcharge skepticism affecting biases in the perceived salience and 
diagnosticity of the SPC. Non-skeptics tended to focus on the price of the focal 
product and disregard the shipping charge (Route 1). Shipping-charge skeptics, on the 
other hand, not only paid increase attention to the shipping charge but also perceived 
the shipping charge, even at a reasonable level, as less justified (Route 2).  
 
 Seller Reputation. Cheema (2008) studied the impact of seller reputation on 
consumers’ processing of the surcharge in a partitioned price in both auction and 
traditional retail setting. Using data from eBay, he found that buyers adjust their bids 
to account for surcharges when buying used DVDs from sellers who have low 
feedback scores but not when buying from sellers who have significantly higher 
feedback scores. In addition, he showed that for low-reputation companies, levying 
high surcharges significantly reduced purchase likelihood relative to an equivalent 
consolidated price. For high-reputation companies, however, there was no difference 
in purchase likelihood between charging all-inclusive price or partitioned the same 
price into a base price and high surcharges. 
 I suggested that the above results occurred because seller reputation can affect 
the salience and diagnosticity of the surcharge. Specifically, when dealing with low-
reputation sellers, participants tended to pay greater attention and elaborate more on 
surcharges. Consequently, their negative reactions to high surcharges led to low 
purchase intentions and willingness to pay (Route 2). In contrast, good reputation may 
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reduce the diagnosticity of surcharges by undermining confidence in any reference 
suggesting that surcharges by reputable sellers are excessive. Because the high 
reputation sellers’ shipping and handling surcharge was low both in importance and in 
processing difficulty (i.e., a relatively small and easy-to-process surcharge), 
consumers buying from high-reputation companies were more likely to use calculating 
strategies instead (Route 6). 
 
Factors Influence the Diagnosticity of the SPC 
 Individual Surcharge Skepticism. See discussion above for shipping-charge 
skeptics. 
  
 Seller Reputation. See discussion above for the interaction between seller 
reputation and surcharge level as well as discussion below for the interaction among 
seller reputation, NFC and surcharge level. 
 
 Individual Price-Persuasion Knowledge. Based on the persuasion-knowledge 
model (PKM) (Friestad & Wright, 1994), a study by Kachersky & Kim (2010) 
investigated the interaction between participants’ manipulated price-format persuasion 
knowledge and price component fairness. They showed that when participants were 
made to believe that firms use partitioned prices to draw consumers’ attention to the 
base price but not to the surcharge, they choose inclusive offer more often than 
comparable partitioned offer, regardless whether the surcharge in the partitioned price 
is fairly priced or not. On the contrary, when participants were made to believe that 
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firms use inclusive price primarily to create perceptions of value, they prefer 
partitioned offer more (less) when the surcharge is fair (unfair) (Route 2). Hence, I 
conclude that, my model is applicable only when consumers do not have any 
persuasion knowledge about the price partitioning strategy because their beliefs about 
the manipulative intent behind the price strategy can override the diagnosticity of the 
SPC. 
 
NFC. When the surcharges are unreasonable, Burman & Biswas (2007) 
showed that NFC affected value perceptions and willingness to purchase in ways 
suggesting that it impacted the perceptions of diagnosticity of the surcharge. High 
NFC participants preferred consolidated prices to partitioned prices due to their 
negative fairness perceptions on the surcharges. However, low NFC responded 
similarly to both price frames in terms of value perceptions and willingness to 
purchase. They suggested that high NFC participants are more likely to go through a 
two-stage process, first recognizing and accepting the surcharges and then discounting 
or rejecting them on the ground of fairness (Route 2). Low NFC participants, on the 
other hand, are unlikely to reach the correction stage and hence will respond similarly 
to both price frames (Route 6).  
Cheema (2008) examined the three-way interaction between NFC, seller 
reputation and surcharge level on purchase likelihood in his fourth study, which 
showed that NFC can moderate the diagnosticity of the SPC when other diagnostic 
cues (e.g., seller reputation) were present. He argued that since low NFC participants 
tend to focus on easy-to-process cues in order to minimize their cognitive effort, 
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seller’s reputation rating would be the main driver for their purchase intentions. High 
NFC participants, on the other hand, will be more likely to incorporate both reputation 
rating and surcharge level into their purchase decisions.   
Results from this study supported his predictions. High NFC participants were 
more likely to buy from low-reputation sellers with a small surcharge than with a high 
surcharge (Route 2). However, there were no differences in purchase likelihood for 
high NFC participants when buying from high-reputation sellers across surcharge 
levels (Route 6). In contrast, no interactions were found between seller reputation and 
surcharge level for low NFC participants in purchase likelihood. Only the main effect 
of reputation was significantly significant, indicating that low NFC participants were 
influenced by seller reputation only.  
Thus, for high NFC participants, the SPC is diagnostic only when seller 
reputation is low. This is consistent with my previous argument. For low NFC 
participants, on the other hand, the impact of seller reputation completely overrode the 
diagnosticity of the SPC. This represents another boundary condition of the model.  
 
Factors Influence the Importance of the SPC 
 Brand Affect. Morwitz et al. (1998) suggested that consumers’ attitude toward 
a brand influences their motivation to process partitioned prices. They argued that 
consumers with either favorable or unfavorable brand attitude may process the price 
information with little effort because their decisions to purchase the brand are less 
likely to be influenced by price information. On the other hand, consumers with 
moderately favorable brand attitude are likely to process price information more 
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thoroughly because accurate price information would help them reduce uncertainty 
and facilitate decision-making. These results are consistent with the idea that strong 
brand affect reduces the importance of the SPC, whereas weak brand affect increases 
the importance of the SPC in the overall price evaluation. Thus, participants whose 
affect for the tested brand were high or low tended to use heuristics to process the 
surcharge (Route 4). Other the other hand, participants with a modest brand affect 
were more likely to combine the base price and the surcharge with precise calculation 
(Route 7).  
 
Factors Influence the Processing Difficulty of the SPC 
 NFC. Findings from several studies indicated that NFC can influence 
consumers’ perceptions on the processing difficulty, salience as well as diagnosticity 
of the SPC. For example, Kim & Kramer's (2006) investigated how NFC influences 
the impact of surcharge presentation on demand. They found that although purchase 
likelihood did not differ among high NFC participants or across dollar surcharge 
conditions, low NFC participants indicated higher purchase likelihood when exposed 
to percentage surcharges than when exposed to dollar surcharges. They suggested that 
low NFC responded to percentage vs. dollar surcharge differentially because the 
former requires more cognitive efforts to process (Route 4 vs. Route 6). Therefore, 
they are more likely to ignore or discount percentage surcharges, resulting in lower 
recalled total purchase cost relative to dollar surcharges. High NFC participants, due 
to their innate tendency to engaging in and enjoying effortful processing of 
information, are more likely to fully take into account surcharges regardless of their 
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presentation formats (Route 6), leading to more accurate price recalls and similar 
purchase likelihood in both surcharge conditions. Consequently, I concluded that NFC 
can influence consumers’ perceived processing difficulty of the SPC.   
   
General Discussions 
Although behavioral pricing researchers have conducted comprehensive and 
in-depth analyses on the topic of price partitioning, inconsistencies and ambiguities 
still exist regarding the underlying psychological mechanisms as Well as its impact on 
evaluation and choice. For instance, drawing upon prospect theory’s value function 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and mental accounting principle of integrating losses 
(Thaler, 1985), some researchers suggested that if consumers treat each price 
component in a partitioned price as a separate loss, then they should prefer integrating 
them into a single price to minimize disutility (Drumwright, 1992; Johnson et al., 
1999).   
 Alternatively, other researchers posited that dividing a single price into two or 
more parts increases consumers’ perceived cost of information processing and 
encourages selective attention and differential processing. The augmented processing 
difficulties of partitioned prices, however, influence evaluation and demand in two 
seemingly paradoxical ways. On the one hand, as cognitive misers (Taylor & Fiske, 
1978), consumers are prone to attend to and process secondary price components (e.g., 
surcharges) less carefully, ignoring or discounting them in their judgment and decision 
making. As a result, price partitioning often leads to an underestimate of perceived or 
recalled total price and higher demand than price consolidating (Morwitz et al., 1998). 
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On the other hand, the separate listing of each price component in a partitioned price 
can also make the secondary price component or its associated benefit more salient 
and attract increased consumer attention. If this is the case, consumers’ preferences 
may be shaped by their perception and evaluation of the secondary price or attribute 
and partitioned prices can either increase or decrease demand relative to comparable 
all-inclusive prices (Bertini & Wathieu, 2008). 
 To address these limitations, I proposed an integrative framework that helps 
distinguish the various psychological mechanisms identified from the extant literature. 
I built my framework upon the five characteristics of the SPC and demonstrated that 
an individual facing a partitioned price will take a particular processing route 
depending on those characteristics. Furthermore, I incorporated both contextual and 
individual difference variables into my framework and discussed their interactions 
with the characteristics of the SPC in altering a consumer’s choice of processing 
strategies.   
 This paper makes several contributions. First, I extended the territory of 
traditional price partitioning research by critically examining empirical research rooted 
in the metal accounting principles and by explicitly incorporating this processing 
mode into my unifying model. Second, I identified five characteristics of the SPC that 
can help us sufficiently yet parsimoniously differentiate among the various 
psychological mechanisms and more accurately predict the exact price partitioning 
effect. Third, my multiple-process framework can be used to identify and explain 
some of the null or reverse effect of price partitioning. For example, it is possible that, 
because competing processing routes co-exit, some consumers may take one route and 
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others may take the contending one. Consequently, on aggregate, the resulting effects 
cancel each other out.  
 However, my integrative framework mainly concerns the cognitive prospect of 
price judgment and evaluation. Yet consumer research has pointed out that affect or 
emotions can also influence consumers’ decision and thought processes in various 
contexts. For example, Lee and Han (2002) showed that advertising a partitioned price 
often triggers negative affect, which, in turn, could degenerate into boycotting of the 
brand and damaging word-of-mouth. In addition, other researchers suggested that the 
partitioned presentation of prices may increase the clarity of the price structure and 
improve the trustworthiness of the sellers (Munger & Grewal, 2001; Xia & Monroe, 
2004). Consequently, future research should explicitly incorporate and examine the 
role of affect in my proposed framework.  
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